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Hospitals are under fierce pressure from the Medicaid and insurance companies to cut the 
cost of their services. Operating rooms are among the biggest cost centers in any hospital, 
and a huge part of their cost is related to purchasing implantable medical devices (IMDs) 
and services related to IMDs. Among all different types of IMDs, orthopedic and cardiac 
IMDs constitute an enormous proportion of the cost.  
A recent Medicaid report reflects the poor performance of hospitals with regard to 
purchasing orthopedic and cardiac implants. One of the main factors that results in such a 
poor performance is the relationship between physicians and the vendors of IMDs. This 
relationship helps IMD vendors to impose higher prices on hospitals, and enjoy high 
bargaining powers as key or sole suppliers of IMDs. This is the main motivation behind 
conducting this research. In other words this study proposes a remedy for this poor 
performance of hospitals through a comprehensive research that investigates this situation 
and propose solutions for this problem. 
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This study examines this problem from the lens of service triads, agency theory, social 
network theory, and balance theory. Based on previous conceptual works in this field, 
this study proposes that a service triad forms when the hospital intends to purchase IMDs. 
This service triad is constituted of the hospital as the buyer, the manufacturer of implant 
as the vendor, and the physician as the customer. This study first explores the factors that 
lead to the strength of ties in the mentioned triad. Secondly it proposes mechanisms that 
the hospital could utilize to change the balance of relationships and achieve better 
performance. 
This study examines the following research questions: How cooperation mechanisms 
initiated by vendor and/or hospital affect the physician’s agency role for either party? 
How monitoring mechanisms initiated by hospital affect the relationship between hospital 
and vendor? How does physician’s agency role for hospital reduce the physician’s agency 
role for vendor? How does each of the following three construct: physician’s agency role 
for vendor, physician’s agency role for hospital, and hospital-vendor relationship, affect 
the standardization of IMDs? How does the standardization of IMDs affect the hospital 
performance?  
To answer these research questions, this study proposes a conceptual model based on the 
above mentioned theories. In order to empirically test this research model, instruments 
were developed and validated in a pilot study for all constructs. Then, the research model 
has been tested using Structural Equations Modeling (SEM) based on data gathered from 
a large scale survey from American hospitals. Respondents of this survey are Operating 
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Room Directors, and Chief Financial Officers of hospitals. Hospitals have been identified 
for future analysis. 
This study makes several theoretical contributions. First, it contributes to the study of 
triads and social network theory. Moreover, this study contributes to healthcare 
management literature. The issue of purchasing implantable medical devices has mostly 
been studied only from a dyadic perspective. Even studies that investigate these 
phenomena from a triadic standpoint have not supported their propositions with strong 
and well-established management theories. This study utilizes robust theories to 
investigate the causes and consequences of the relationship between hospital, vendor, and 
physician. 
In this study a relatively large sample (n=393) of usable responses from hospital 
administrative across the nation i.e. operating room directors and chief financial officers, 
has been gathered. The response rate in this study 38.57%. Responses were used for a 
structural equations modeling analysis to test the hypotheses. All hypotheses proposed in 
this study have been strongly supported. 
This is another contribution of this study. Empirical studies on service triads are very 
scarce, and extant works are mainly conceptual. Reputable research institutions in 
operations management and supply chain management, insistently call for empirical 
papers in the field of service triads. This work will be among the very first researches that 
answer this call and fill this gap in the literature. This study fills this gap by empirically 
testing the antecedents and consequences of the three relationships in a service triad. 
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Chapter 1 
1. Introduction 
Healthcare expenditure in The United States is higher than the total healthcare spending of 
the next ten biggest spenders: Japan, Germany, France, China, the U.K., Italy, Canada, 
Brazil, Spain and Australia (Brill 2013). According to a recently published data set (The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2013), United States healthcare 
expenditure between 1980 and 2012, as a percentage of gross domestic product, is 
substantially higher than any other country in the world. According to the same report, in 
2011 the United States has spent 17.7% of its GDP on healthcare. 
Although the rate of growth in healthcare expenditure has reduced in recent years, reports 
show that it will still grow at a higher speed compared to the growth of the national income 
in near future (Kaiser Family Foundation 2012; Ginsburg 2008). Many factors have been 
cited as contributing to the rising cost of healthcare in the United States, among which one 
can refer to advancements in medical technology and drugs, rise in chronic disease 
especially among aging population, and administrative costs (Kaiser Family Foundation 
2012). 
Among others, one of the main the factors that contribute to high cost of healthcare, is the 
cost of medical devices. Rapid innovations in medical technology cause a huge demand for 
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use of cutting edge devices. However, surprisingly these state of the art devices do not 
necessarily guarantee better quality of care (Shah et al. 2008); (US Congress 2008). 
Nevertheless, hospitals are under intense pressure to utilize these new devices. Part of this 
pressure is from vendors of such devices and part of it is from physicians who are 
considered to be the end customer of these devices. On one hand, these expensive devices 
increase the cost of care for the hospital, and on the other hand due to healthcare reform, 
payments from insurance companies and CMS (Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services) are being reduced and stringent. This situation puts hospitals in a dilemma on 
how to balance the quality and cost of care. 
Hospitals try to reduce the high prices that they have to pay for medical devices. However 
in price negotiations with vendors, another factor plays a critical role, and reduces the 
negotiation power of the hospital. This important factor is nothing but the preference of 
physicians who use these devices. Physician preference for certain devices, which mainly 
stem from their relationship with vendors and manufacturers of medical devices, drastically 
affect the ability of hospital in gaining better prices while purchasing medical devices.  
In the next section of this chapter, this study briefly reviews the healthcare reform and 
bundled payment. Next, medical devices and specifically implantable medical devices will 
be introduced. Then, the magnitude of healthcare expenditures caused by the high price of 
the implantable medical devices will be reviewed. Afterwards, this study investigates the 
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preference of physicians and their key role in cost containment initiatives. Finally the 
problem statement and research questions will be explained. 
 
1. 1.  Affordable Care Act and Bundled Payment 
In the recent years, many solutions have been proposed to control the healthcare cost. This 
has mainly reflected in the passage of the Affordable Care Act, which aims to improve 
quality of care, and reduce the cost of healthcare (Kaiser Family Foundation 2012). This 
act, which is the most significant overhaul of the United States’ healthcare system since 
the passage of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, plans to reform many aspects of the 
healthcare system in the United States. President Barack Obama has signed the Affordable 
Care Act in March 2010, and the United States Supreme Court has approved the 
constitutionality of the most of this act in 2012 (Reuters 2012). 
The Affordable Care Act plans to increase the access, affordability, and quality of 
healthcare in the United States. This act aims to achieve these objectives by expanding 
public and private insurance, increasing the number of insured individuals, and reduce the 
cost of healthcare both for government and people. This act intends to reduce cost and 
increase the healthcare system quality by means of incentives, competition, and regulation 
(Elmendorf 2011). 
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One of the main measures of the Affordable Care Act is moving from fee-for-service (FFS) 
payment method to bundled payment in order to increase competition and regulations. In 
the fee-for-service method healthcare providers are paid for every medical service 
separately. Since the payment in this method is dependent on the quantity of service, it 
gives healthcare providers an incentive to provide more (and often unnecessary) 
treatments. This method, which is very dominant in the United States healthcare system, 
increases cost and decreases efficiency (Berenson and Rich 2010). 
Unlike the fee-for-service method, in bundled payment method, hospital, physicians, and 
other care providers receives a single pre-negotiated payment for a pre-defined episode of 
care. This method in essence is a type of risk contracting. If cost of the medical service is 
less than the bundled payment, hospital and other providers will receive the difference in 
benefit. However, if the cost is higher than the pre-defined bundled payment, hospital, 
physician and other providers will not be compensated for the difference. This payment 
model is designed to lead to higher quality and lower cost (Miller 2009). 
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services has recently scheduled to begin a pilot program 
for the bundled payment method. In this pilot program, hospitals will receive a single 
payment for an episode of care. Similar to CMS, other commercial insurance companies 
have proposed various versions of bundled payment. However the CMS version of bundled 
payment is different from commercial insurance program in which it covers multiple 
healthcare providers across a continuum of care (Huron Consulting Group 2011). 
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1. 2.  Physician Payment Sunshine Act 
As part of the affordable care act, manufacturers of medical devices covered by federal 
health care programs, have to report every financial relationship with physicians and 
teaching hospitals. This law, which is called the “Sunshine Act”, is intended to increase 
the transparency of industry-physician financial relationship (Wilson 2014). 
By creating and publishing public records, this act provides all beneficiaries with financial 
information about the relationship between physicians, teaching hospitals, and 
manufacturers of medical devices. This program mitigates the conflict of interest, increased 
cost, and compromised patient care, mainly caused by payments from vendors and 
manufacturers to physicians. This information would be available to public (Wilson 2014). 
 
1. 3.  Implantable Medical Device 
Implantable medical devices (IMD) are medical devices that intended to be wholly or 
partially introduced into the body of a human being by surgical intervention. They remain 
in place after the surgical procedure for at least thirty days. They also refer to medical 
devices that replace an epithelial surface, or the surface of an eye, of a human being (ISO 
2003). 
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As the life expectancy grows in the United Sates, aging population will need more 
procedures that involve implantable medical devices, specially cardiac and orthopedic 
IMDs. Implantable medical devices can increase the quality of life and prolongs the life of 
patients. The anticipated increase in demand for implantable medical devices significantly 
increase the supply cost for hospitals. In many cases the cost of IMDs is the most expensive 
element of a surgical procedure or a hospital stay (US Government Accountability Office 
2012). 
According to a recent report, the U.S. implantable medical devices market will grow at an 
annual compounded rate of 8 percent over seven years to be worth $73.9 billion by 2018. 
The market was valued at $43.1 billion in 2011. (Transparency Market Research 2013) 
According to the same report (Transparency Market Research 2013), the overall implant 
market is made up of reconstructive joint replacements, spinal implants, cardiovascular 
implants, dental implants, intraocular lens, and breast implants. All segments are expected 
to see growth because of the increasing prevalence of chronic disease and an aging 
population.  
Figure 1-1 illustrates the expenditure per Medicare beneficiary in dollars for different IMDs 
from 2004 to 2009. As evident in this figure, orthopedic and cardiac procedures accounted 
for nearly all IMD-related Medicare expenditures from 2004 through 2009. Reports show 
that the first five implantable medical devices that cause highest Medicare spending are 
orthopedic and cardiac devices (US Government Accountability Office 2012). 
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Figure 1-1- IMD Expenditure per FFS Beneficiary 
Source (US Government Accountability Office 2012) 
 
As stated earlier, orthopedic and cardiac implantable medical devices constitute the highest 
spending of hospital in procedures that involve IMDs. Moreover, influence of physicians’ 
preference for certain manufacturers and models of implantable medical devices has a 
significant influence on the final purchasing decision. Furthermore, the confidentiality of 
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negotiated prices and lack of transparency in purchasing implantable medical devices (US 
Government Accountability Office 2012) has led to significant price variations among 
different hospitals for purchasing the same device. Because of these unique characteristics, 
this study only focuses on the orthopedic and cardiac IMDs and investigates the hospital 
purchasing process for these devices.  
The following sections provide a brief discussion on the features and characteristics of the 
orthopedic and cardiac implantable medical devices. 
 
1. 3. 1. Orthopedic IMDs 
Orthopedic implantable medical devices include joint implants, most commonly hips and 
knees, as well as spinal devices used for spinal fusion. Figure 1-2, for instance shows the 
Medicare expenditure per beneficiary in dollars for different orthopedic IMDS from 2004 
to 2009. As indicated in this figure, procedures related to knees, hips, shoulders, and the 
spine accounted for nearly all of Medicare’s orthopedic IMD expenditures in 2009. Spinal 
fusion procedures had the highest growth in per beneficiary expenditures—more than 
doubling during the period. 
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Figure 1-2- Orthopedic IMD Expenditure per FFS Beneficiary 
Source (US Government Accountability Office 2012) 
 
1. 3. 2. Cardiac IMDs 
Cardiac IMDs include cardiac rhythm management devices (such as pacemakers, AICDs, 
CRT-Ds) and coronary stents. As shown in Figure 1-3, cardiac procedures accounted for 
relatively little of the growth in Medicare IMD-related expenditures from 2004 through 
2009. Medicare expenditures for cardiac IMD procedures increased from $9.8 billion in 
2004 to $10.3 billion in 2009, an increase of 1.2 percent per year. 
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Figure 1-3- Cardiac IMD Expenditure per FFS Beneficiary 
Source (US Government Accountability Office 2012) 
 
 
1. 3. 3. Utilization of IMDs 
Between 2004 and 2009, the overall increase in per-beneficiary Medicare expenditures for 
IMD procedures resulted more from increased utilization than from an increased average 
payment per claim. Utilization increased at a faster rate for orthopedic devices compared 
with cardiac devices. Utilization per beneficiary of orthopedic IMD procedures related to 
knees and hips were highest. The fastest increase in utilization of orthopedic IMD 
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procedures came from those related to spinal fusions, increasing at a rate of 12.1 percent 
per year (US Government Accountability Office 2012). 
 
1. 3. 4. Price Variation in IMDs 
A recent report (US Government Accountability Office 2012) shows that prices that 
hospitals pay for same implantable medical device are significantly different for different 
hospitals. For instance the difference between the highest and lowest price that hospitals 
are paying for a particular cardiac implantable medical device is about $9,000. Same study 
provides evidence for considerable price variation for orthopedic implantable medical 
devices. 
 
1. 3. 5. Managing Physician Preference for IMDs 
A particular factor that influences the prices hospitals pay for IMDs is hospitals’ ability to 
manage physician preference. The influence of physicians on hospitals’ IMD purchasing 
decisions is a factor particular to the IMD market that affects prices hospitals pay. While 
physicians generally are not involved in price negotiations, they often express strong 
preferences for certain manufacturers and models of IMDs, known as physician preference 
items. 
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Physicians tend to use devices developed by one particular manufacturer, often due to 
being trained in a hospital that used that manufacturer’s products or past experience with a 
manufacturer’s products. Therefore, they may be reluctant to switch manufacturers and 
learn how to use implants from another manufacturer which might requires using a new set 
of instruments. 
In order to reduce cost and control the purchasing process of IMDs, hospital’s approach to 
physicians regarding these items must mitigate the strong preference of physicians for 
certain manufacturers. However, physicians heavily rely on manufacturer representatives 
to provide technical support during procedures involving IMDs, including setting up the 
operating room, consulting with the physician about the procedure, and programming 
devices, such as AICDs and CRT-Ds.  
In addition, some physicians might be loyal to certain manufacturers with whom they have 
consulting or professional relationships. A report published in The Wall Street Journal in 
December 2010 revealed a suspicious strong financial relationship between specific 
physicians in a relatively small hospital and a leading spinal device manufacturer. Not 
surprisingly, those physicians were performing one of the highest number of procedures 
that involve IMDs manufactured by the aforementioned vendor (Carreyrou and McGinty 
2010). 
Despite the financial impact of physician preference, hospitals are likely to accommodate 
physicians’ IMD preferences in order to retain patient referrals to their facilities. Hospitals 
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that ask physicians to be sensitive to IMD prices often have encountered push back from 
physicians. There are reports of hospitals’ attempts at cost-savings that led some physicians 
to migrate away from their facilities. Because physicians are highly dependent on their 
relationship with manufacturer representatives who provide the physicians with technical 
support, they may not be willing to switch device models. Physician preferences for 
particular manufacturer’s devices and models may further reduce hospitals’ power in price 
negotiations with vendor. Physician’s preferences may shape hospitals’ purchasing 
decisions and limit hospital’s ability to obtain discounts from device manufacturers (US 
Government Accountability Office 2012). 
 
1. 4.  High Cost of Implantable Medical Devices 
Rapid advancements in healthcare technology and availability of new medical devices  
(Zhang et al. 2014) have increased the demand for more expensive procedures and 
treatments while these methods are not necessarily cost effective (US Congress 2008). As 
mentioned earlier, one of the fastest growing fragments of healthcare expenditure is the 
cost of implantable medical devices (IMD) (Burns et al. 2009). Cost of implantable medical 
devices is a major proportion of the extravagant healthcare spending. Surprisingly, annual 
expenditure on knee and hip replacements is more than what Hollywood makes at the box 
office (Brill 2013).  
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According to a recent government report, hospital expenditures on procedures involving 
IMDs increased from $16 billion to $20 billion over the period of 2004 to 2009. As 
mentioned earlier, orthopedic and cardiac procedures account for almost all procedures 
related to IMDs.  This increase in hospital spending is due to increased utilization as well 
as increased average payment for implantable medical devices (US Government 
Accountability Office 2012). As researchers (Streit et al. 2012) indicate: 
“The costs of implantable medical devices account for a high percentage of hospital 
costs and in some cases the payments hospitals make to manufacturers for 
implantable medical devices used in surgical procedures are higher than the 
payments made to physicians for performing those procedures”  
This unprecedented increase in cost of IMDs and their related procedures along with new 
methods of reimbursement from Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) and 
insurance companies, e.g. bundled payment, increase the pressure on hospitals to take 
measures to reduce cost and increase efficiency while maintaining patient safety and the 
quality of care. 
On one hand, hospitals have to pay very high prices for expensive orthopedic and cardiac 
implantable medical devices, and on the other hand, hospitals receive a single pre-agreed 
payment for a pre-defined procedure involving a cardiac or orthopedic implantable medical 
device. 
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This situation prompts the hospital administration and specifically the purchasing 
departments to negotiate with IMD manufacturers and vendors for lower price while 
maintaining the standard quality. For instance hospitals that work with smaller number of 
vendors for a specific device could enjoy volume discounts (formulary model). Likewise, 
hospitals try to convince vendors to agree on a maximum price (payment cap model) 
(Burns et al. 2009). 
However according to a recent report hospitals face difficulties in achieving a favorable 
price in purchasing certain IMDs (US Government Accountability Office 2012). 
Obviously, one major factor that explains this inability of hospitals in achieving lower 
prices in purchasing IMDs is the influence of physicians and their preference for certain 
implantable medical devices. 
 
1. 5.  Physician Preference for Implantable Medical Devices 
Although physicians are not directly involved in the process of purchasing IMDs, they 
usually have a preference for a certain manufacturer and model of IMD. This preference 
makes it hard for the hospital to purchase IMDs from another manufacturer that offers more 
favorable prices and maintain the required standard quality. Moreover if different 
physicians at the hospital have different preference for the same type of IMD, hospital 
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cannot achieve lower prices through volume discount (US Government Accountability 
Office 2012). 
As briefly stated earlier, physicians’ preference for certain manufacturers of implantable 
medical devices is mainly due to their long-standing relationship with manufacturers. This 
relationship has multiple dimensions, from financial payments to training and support that 
physicians receive from vendors and their representatives (Burns et al. 2009). This study 
explains the details of the relationship between IMD vendors and physicians in the 
following sections.  
In order to be able to achieve lower prices in purchasing implantable medical devices, 
hospitals need to manage their relationship with physicians via aligning their interest with 
that of the hospital. Hospitals must maintain a strong relationship with physicians in order 
to be able to manage their preference for IMDs to gain leverage in purchasing negotiations. 
This will help hospitals to achieve lower prices (Burns et al. 2009; US Government 
Accountability Office 2012). For instance, hospitals try to engage physicians in different 
gain sharing programs to align their preference with the interest of the hospital 
(collaboration model) (Burns et al. 2009). This study discusses different mechanisms that 
hospitals could utilize to bring physicians to their side. 
 
1. 6.  Triadic Relationship 
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In purchasing implantable medical devices, a unique situation emerges. In this situation, 
the link between hospital and physician, the link between hospital and vendor, and the link 
between vendor and physicians affect the purchasing decisions of hospital, and the 
probability of gaining better prices. This study conceptualizes this situation as a triad. This 
triad is constituted of the buyer of IMDs (hospital), the supplier or provider of IMDs and 
IMDs services (vendor), and the customer of the IMDs (physician). In this triad, both the 
hospital and the vendor try to maintain stronger bond with the physician. On one hand, 
vendor tries to pull the preference of physicians towards its implantable medical devices. 
On the other hand, hospital tries to change the preference of physician toward implantable 
medical devices that are less expensive and provide the required standard quality. This triad 
has been illustrated in Figure 1-4. 
 
Figure 1-4- Triad of Hospital, Vendor, and Physician 
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As stated above, strong bond between IMD vendor and physician, leads to physicians’ 
preference for specific device that vendor represents. This preference in turn lowers the 
ability of the hospital in negotiating for best price with vendor. Therefore, hospitals also 
try to maintain strong bond with physicians to influence their preference for IMDs. 
This study investigates this phenomenon through the theoretical lens of service triads. A 
service triad has been defined as a triad consisting of three actors, a buying organization, a 
service provider or supplier, a customer, and the links between them (van der Valk and van 
Weele 2011). In this study the buying organization is the hospital, the service provider or 
supplier is the IMD vendor, and the customer is the physician. 
The links between the three actors in a triad represents the nature of relationships. The 
nature of relationship between hospital and physician is conceptualized as a principal-agent 
relationship in which physician is considered as the agent of hospital. Likewise, the nature 
of relationship between vendor and physician is viewed through the lens of agency 
relationship. In this relationship physician is considered as the agent of vendor. Therefore 
this study looks into the duality of physician’s role as agent of two principals and 
investigates the causes and consequences of this conflict. The relationship between hospital 
and vendor is conceptualized as a buyer-supplier (service provider) relationship. 
This study intends to explore mechanisms that hospital can utilize to balance all three 
relationships. Moreover, this study explores measures that hospital can use to control and 
monitor the relationship between vendor and physician to prevent them from collusion. 
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1. 7.  Problem Statement 
Scholars (van der Valk and van Weele 2011) have investigated prior studies in the triads 
literature. They argue that in the triads’ literature, two “streams can be identified. The first 
and largest stream of triad research focuses on triads consisting of one buyer and two 
suppliers. A second stream focuses on triads with other actor compositions, like for 
example two buyers and one supplier” (van der Valk and van Weele 2011) (p. 6). 
Researchers believe that both of these streams have been focused on supply network 
studies, and all of these studies are conducted in manufacturing context. In other words, 
literature on service triads is scarce (van der Valk and van Weele 2011). The only study 
that makes an important theoretical contribution to service triads is the study of bridge, 
bridge decay, and bridge transfer (Li and Choi 2009). These concepts will be explained in 
detail in the second chapter. 
Empirical studies that investigate service triads are almost non-existent. There is a call in 
the literature for empirical studies to test the theories provided in the service triads’ realm, 
and shed light on the interactions of triadic relationships (van der Valk and van Weele 
2011).  
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Although the study of (Li and Choi 2009) investigates service triads, and theorizes the 
concept of bridge, bridge decay, and bridge transfer, it does not clarify which mechanisms 
should be utilized by the buyer to maintain its leverage i.e. the state of permanent bridge 
decay. Moreover their study does not address the mechanisms that foster the strong 
relationships between buyer and customer, as well as between buyer and vendor. 
This study fills the mentioned gaps in the triads’ literature by providing a study of service 
triads that investigates triads outside the manufacturing field. In paucity of empirical 
studies in the triads’ literature, to the best of author’s knowledge this research is among the 
very first studies that empirically test its proposed hypotheses and answers the call for 
empirical studies in service triads. In doing so, this study draws on the balance theory, the 
social network theory, and the agency theory. 
This study also continues the study of bridge, and bridge decay, by investigating the 
mechanisms that lead to buyer’s strong relationship with vendor and customer. These 
concepts will be defined in detail in the next chapter. This study empirically investigates 
mechanisms that buyer should use to maintain the state of permanent bridge decay in this 
service triad. 
Sourcing studies performed in the healthcare setting are mainly focused on sourcing goods, 
and there is a lack of studies on service sourcing in healthcare. This study contributes to 
sourcing literature by conducting an empirical research on service sourcing in purchasing 
physician preference items in the healthcare setting. Moreover, most sourcing studies in 
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the healthcare setting have been conducted at the dyadic level. This study extends the scope 
of research to triadic level. Drawing on the above discussion, this study proposes the 
following research questions: 
 
1. 8.  Research Questions 
a) How cooperation mechanisms initiated by vendor and/or hospital 
affect the physician’s agency role for either party? 
b) How monitoring mechanisms initiated by hospital affect the 
physician’s agency role for hospital as well as vendor? 
c) How does physician’s agency role for hospital reduce the 
physician’s agency role for vendor? 
d) How does each of the following three constructs: physician’s agency 
role for vendor, physician’s agency role for hospital, and hospital-vendor 
relationship, affect the standardization of IMDs? 
e) How does the standardization of IMDs affect the performance? 
1. 9.  Contribution 
This study makes several theoretical contributions. First, it contributes to the study of triads 
and social network theory. Triadic literature has referred to cooperative relationships 
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between different actors in a triad as positive relationship. However those studies have 
stopped at that point and do not investigate the nature and antecedents of these 
relationships. By studying he nature of these relationships and their antecedents, this study 
brings a new scope to the study of triads. 
Moreover, this study contributes to healthcare management literature. The issue of 
purchasing implantable medical devices has mostly been studied only from dyadic 
perspective (Dobrzykowski et al. 2014). Even studies that investigate these phenomena 
from a triadic standpoint have not supported their propositions with strong and well-
established management theories. This study utilizes robust theories of social network 
theory, balance theory, and agency theory to investigate the relationship between hospital, 
vendor, and physician from a triadic lens. 
In the following chapter a theoretical model for the study of the above research questions 
will be proposed. This model is based on the study of triads, which has its roots in the 
agency theory, social network theory, and balance theory. Before presenting the theoretical 
model, a review of the literature in the mentioned theories will be presented. Drawing on 
these theories the conceptual model will be presented, and hypotheses will be proposed. 
Finally the proposed hypotheses will be theoretically and logically supported.
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Chapter 2 
2. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
In order to answer the research questions, this study develops a theoretical framework that 
looks into the problem through a triadic lens. Before introducing this framework, this study 
reviews the highlights of the balance theory, social network theory, and agency theory. 
These theories serve as the foundation of this study. Drawing on the mentioned theories, 
this study proposes the theoretical framework, a conceptual model, and a set of hypotheses. 
 
2. 1.  Balance Theory 
Balance theory has its roots in the behavioral psychology studies. This theory initially 
developed to explain the nature of relationships between individuals in a social setting 
(Heider 2013). Researchers in sociological science (Simmel 1950) argue that behaviors of 
people in a social setting have convincing generalizability. Since balance theory deals with 
the behaviors of individuals in a relationship, scholars have brought this theory to the group 
and organization level (Madhavan et al. 2004). Organizational scientists have extended this 
theory and applied it to the inter-organizational relationships (Wuyts et al. 2004). One of 
the main characteristics of balance theory is that it is the only theory (Choi and Wu 2009) 
that clearly explains the nature of triadic relationships. This characteristic makes the 
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balance theory one of the fittest theories that can inform the triadic relationship between 
firms, and between individuals. Moreover, balance theory defines individual relationships 
in a way that is very similar to the relationship between organizations (Macneil 1973). 
Another fact that makes this theory suitable for this study is that triadic relationships in this 
study entail a mix of organizational and individual relationships. For instance the 
relationship between hospital and vendor is an inter-organizational relationship, while the 
relationship between vendor representative and physician is at the individual level. The 
fact that this theory works at both levels makes it the most proper theoretical lens for the 
study of the service triad proposed in this research. 
 
2. 1. 1. Triad in Balanced State 
According to balance theory, a triadic relationship will be in a balanced state when all the 
relationships are positive (Choi and Wu 2009). Positive relationship between two 
individuals has been simply defined as reaching equilibrium on how to interact with each 
other and like each other (Choi and Wu 2009). At the organizational level, however, a 
positive relationship represents a trust-based relationship in which the two parties do not 
show opportunistic behaviors, openly communicate relevant information, make asset 
specific investments in the mutual business, and have frequent interactions (Choi and Wu 
2009). In such a triad, that all three parties have positive relationship with each other, 
obviously everybody benefits and have higher performance. One great example of such a 
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balanced state is practices that Toyota implements with regards to its suppliers (Choi and 
Wu 2009).  
 
2. 1. 2. Balance Theory in Purchasing IMDs 
As stated earlier in chapter one, this study considers the three parties involved in purchasing 
IMDS in a triadic relationship. Hospital (buyer), vendor of IMDs (supplier), and physician 
(customer) have relationships at different levels, however the focus of this study is on their 
relationship in connection to purchasing implantable medical devices. Hospital in this triad 
tries to maintain positive relationship with vendor and physician. Hospital also uses 
mechanisms to maintain a positive relationship between vendor and physician in the 
clinical setting. This triad has been depicted in Figure 2-1. 
 
Figure 2-1- Balanced Triad in the Context of this Study 
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As mentioned earlier this triad is framed in the procurement setting. Although in the 
procurement setting, hospital does not necessarily wants a strong relationship between 
physician (orthopedic or cardiac physician) and vendor of IMDs, but cooperation 
mechanisms, initiated by vendor, foster this relationship. In the next section, this study 
explains how this triad, and specifically this relationship cause increased cost of care.  
Therefore the service triad in this study is a balanced triad (Choi and Wu 2009) in which 
hospital has positive procurement relationships with physician and vendor. Moreover, 
vendor initiates cooperation mechanisms through which the relationship between physician 
and vendor becomes positive. In the next sections, this study defines these concepts in 
detail and examines the antecedents and consequences of relationships in such a triad. 
 
2. 2.  Social Network Theory 
Social network theory conceptualizes the social relationships as ties, and individuals as 
nodes (Borgatti and Li 2009). According to the social network theory, a social network is 
comprised of nodes and the relevant ties between them (Burt 2009). Although many 
different types of ties could be considered between nodes, this study focuses on a map of 
three nodes and ties between them, i.e. a triad. 
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Social network theory argues that the characteristics of nodes are less important than their 
relationships (ties) with other nodes in a network (Burt 2009; Li and Choi 2009). This 
theory is also used to define the social capital of actors. Social capital is derived from the 
relationship (tie) that an individual (node) in the network has with other individuals. 
Through these relationships individual gain access to resources that otherwise were not 
accessible (Borgatti and Foster 2003; Li and Choi 2009). 
Management researchers have brought social network theory from the individual and 
sociological level to the inter-organizational level (Borgatti and Foster 2003; Borgatti and 
Li 2009). This theory has been used to investigate the relationships between companies a 
well as the relationship between individuals in different companies. Through these 
relationships companies exchange information, prevent competition, and even collude in 
some settings (Borgatti and Foster 2003; Li and Choi 2009). 
The notion that the social network theory is capable of explaining the relationships both at 
individual level and organization level makes it an appropriate theory to address the 
relationships of this study. As stated earlier, although everything is being looked at from 
the hospital point of view, however, relationships are both at the individual level, e.g. 
vendor representative and physician, and organizational level, e.g. hospital and vendor. 
 
2. 2. 1. Structural Hole 
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One of the concepts in the social network theory that this study draws on is the concept of 
structural hole. Structural hole is defined as the absence of relationship (tie) between two 
parties (nodes) in a network (Burt 2009). This concept in the study of triads, translates into 
lack of relationship between two of three actors. This situation, in the context of this study, 
has been illustrated in Figure 2-2. 
 
Figure 2-2- Structural Hole 
 
The concept of structural hole first appeared in the literature (Simmel 1950) as “Tertius”. 
Later on, other scholars (Burt 2009) developed the concept of structural hole in the social 
network theory based on the notion of tertius. Simply put, tertius is the third actor that 
controls the two other actors in absence of a direct relationship between them (Simmel 
2010; Burt 2009). The ability of this third actor to control and benefit from the relationship 
of the two other actors is called “Tertius Gaudens” (Li and Choi 2009). 
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Tertius Gaudens is adapted from Latin into English. Linguistically it means “the third who 
rejoices”. In other words, it refers to a third party who benefits from the lack of relationship, 
or adversarial relationship between two parties. One example of tertius gaudens is Apple 
Inc. Although Apple only does design of its products and contracts with Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) to manufacture its products, it maintains a tight control 
over quality, pricing, marketing, and customer service. Apple is so diligent in this matter, 
that there is virtually no relationship between its end customers and its outsourcing agents, 
i.e. OEMs. In summary Apple does what it can to prevent formation of a triad, in order to 
enjoy the brokerage of spanning across the structural hole (Zhang et al. 2014). 
2. 2. 2. Bridge and Bridge decay 
Another concept that serves as foundation of the conceptual model in this study is the 
concept of bridge and bridge decay (Li and Choi 2009). Bridge in a triadic setting, refers 
to the party that has positioned on the structural hole (Burt 2009; Choi and Wu 2009). 
Bridge could span the structural hole and benefit from the lack of connection between the 
two separated nodes. In other words, since the two isolated parties have no relationship 
(tie), they do not possess any social capital. In this setting the actor that capture the position 
of bridge enjoys the brokerage opportunities (Zaheer and Bell 2005). This situation, in the 
context of this study has been depicted in Figure 2-3. In this figure, hospital is positioned 
on a “hypothetical” structural hole and enjoys the benefits of being in the position of bridge. 
However, as will be discussed later, this situation will not happen in a service triad, as the 
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service provider (vendor), and customer (physician) are always in contact and have a long 
lasting relationship. 
 
Figure 2-3- Hospital in the Bridge Position in the Context of this Study 
 
In some manufacturing triadic settings, e.g. buyer-supplier-customer, by putting barriers 
between supplier and customer, buyer can retain the bridge position. However, in the 
service settings, such as the setting of this study, the bridge position does not last forever 
(Burt 2002; Li and Choi 2009). This is one of the key characteristics of service settings that 
distinguishes it from manufacturing setting (Sanders et al. 2007). Consider the context of 
this study in which hospital is buyer of a device and service for its physician. In this setting 
hospital (buyer) has no choice but to let the vendor’s representative (supplier) and 
physician (customer) to interact with each other. In this scenario, physician and vendor 
representative build a relationship, and the bridge position of hospital starts to decay. As 
this position weakens the social capital and leverages attributed to this position also 
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weaken. In other words buyer does not enjoy the control that it used to have over the 
structural hole. This phenomenon is called “bridge decay” (Burt 2002). In the context of 
this study, since physician and vendor have a longstanding relationship, hospital is 
positioned in the state of bridge decay. This situation has been illustrated in Figure 2-4. 
 
Figure 2-4- Bridge Decay in the Context this Study 
 
2. 2. 3. Permanent Bridge Decay 
The bridge decay is a not at the best interest of the focal company, i.e. buyer or hospital in 
the setting of this study. Scholars propose a remedy for the bridge decay situation (Li and 
Choi 2009). This remedy is called the permanent bridge decay (Liker and Choi 2004; Li 
and Choi 2009). In this situation buyer maintains close contact with both buyer and 
supplier, and monitor the relationship between them to control how the supplier is doing 
his job and how satisfied the customer is (Liker and Choi 2004; Li and Choi 2009). This 
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monitoring also prevents possible situations in which supplier and customer collude to 
bypass buyer or to force buyer to buy products and services that are not economically 
optimal (Li and Choi 2009). Recent studies extend the literature on service triads by 
bringing a new vision and suggesting that engaging in a service triad has integral risk for 
the buyer, and possessing productive employees could mitigate it (Modi et al. 2015). In the 
context of this study, hospital should maintain close relationship with both vendor and 
physician, and simultaneously should monitor and control the relationship between 
physician and vendor, in order to be able to stay in the state of permanent bridge decay. 
Although it may seem like a poor choice for buyer to continuously monitor the relationship 
between supplier and customer, but it is by far better than leaving everything to the two 
other parties and relinquish the control and leverage (Li and Choi 2009). This situation has 
been illustrated in Figure 2-5. 
 
Figure 2-5- Permanent Bridge Decay in the Context of this Study 
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2. 2. 4. Concepts of Social Network Theory in Purchasing IMDs 
In the context of this study, as vendor and physician come into close contact, the bridge 
position of hospital starts to decay. In other words, strong relationship between IMD vendor 
and physician, leads to higher physician preference for specific IMDs sold by vendor. This 
relationship also lowers the power of the hospital in price negotiation for purchasing those 
IMDs. Therefore, drawing on the work of Li and Choi (2009), hospital (buyer) needs to 
manage its relationship with IMD vendor (supplier), and physician (customer). Hospital 
should also monitor the relationship between IMD vendor (supplier), and physician 
(customer) at both the clinical and procurement level. This will help hospital to prevent 
from falling into the total bridge decay position in which the power in price negotiations 
will be transferred to the vendor. This has been illustrated in Figure 2-5. 
Hospital should actively monitor the relationship between vendor and physician. Moreover 
hospital should maintain a close relationship with physician and receives feedback about 
the performance of vendor. Finally hospital engages closely with vendor and solves the 
issues between vendor and physician. This will put hospital in the position of permanent 
bridge decay. In this position hospital does not enjoy the full leverage of bridge position, 
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however it does not lose its bridge position and will not transfer it to either vendor or 
physician. 
 
2. 3.  Agency Theory 
Agency theory investigates contractual agreements between principal and agent, under 
which the performance of principal would be higher. It also addresses that which type of 
monitoring by principal over the activities of agent will contribute to better performance 
(Eisenhardt 1989; van der Valk and van Iwaarden 2011). 
Agency theory is concerned with resolving two problems that can occur in agency 
relationships: 
a) The first problem is the agency problem that arises when either the goals of the 
principal and agent conflict, or it is difficult or expensive for the principle to 
verify what the agent is actually doing. The problem here is that the principal 
cannot verify that the agent has behaved appropriately (Eisenhardt 1989). 
b) The second problem is the problem of risk sharing that arises when the principal 
and agent have different attitudes towards risk. The problem here is that the 
principle and the agent may prefer different actions because of the different risk 
preferences (Eisenhardt 1989). 
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Although agency theory serves a great theoretical background to investigate the 
relationships between different organizations, scholars have mainly used it with a dyadic 
focus on the relationship between principal and agent (Zhang et al. 2014). Researchers in 
the operations and supply chain management literature, traditionally develop models based 
on the agency theory that has a dyadic unit of analysis (Handley and Benton 2012).  
In recent years, however, the potential of agency theory in modeling operations and supply 
chain management issues in the framework of triadic relationships in and between 
organizations have received more attention (Wilding et al. 2012). Some researchers started 
to use this robust theory as the theoretical ground for their studies that focus at the triadic 
relationship between principal and agent(s). Scholars adopt agency theory to look at the 
buyer, subcontractor, and customer triadic relationship. They developed propositions on 
the design of contracts and monitoring (van der Valk and van Iwaarden 2011). 
One of the types of agency problem that fits the context of this study is vertical agency 
problem (Combs et al. 2004). Vertical agency problem refers to a situation in which there 
is a conflict of interest between a firm and its managers. Scholars argue that shirking (i.e. 
reducing efforts) is higher among employee managers in comparison to those who have 
some sort of gain sharing contract with the firm (Fama and Jensen 1983). In contrast to 
managers who have strong ownership ties with the company, employee managers who do 
not receive ownership incentives are more inclined to reduce effort, and for the same reason 
they must be monitored more strongly (Bradach 1997). In other words, solving the vertical 
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agency problem involves a tradeoff between giving goal alignment incentives, and close 
monitoring. When monitoring is costly or repulsive, gain sharing techniques are preferred 
(Combs et al. 2004).  
This is analogous to the relationship between hospitals administration and physicians. On 
one hand, too much monitoring on physicians, who entitle themselves to a great air of 
authority, would yield negative results. On the other hand, relaxing the monitoring task and 
just relying on incentives will put hospital in a weak position. Therefore a combination of 
balanced monitoring and incentives is proposed to minimize the opportunistic behavior of 
the agents (Zhang et al. 2014). 
This study uses the agency theory to addresses its problem statement. The concept of bridge 
decay is analogous to the concept of supply chain disintermediation (Rossetti and Choi 
2008). In supply chain disintermediation supplier maintains direct contact with customer 
and bypasses the buyer. Scholars (Rossetti and Choi 2008) have studied this phenomenon 
as a principal-agent problem, and concluded that buyers should consider aligning goals 
through incentives and actions. 
 
2. 3. 1. Cooperation Mechanisms 
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Although the studies of triads (Choi and Wu 2009; Li and Choi 2009; Wu et al. 2010; Wu 
and Choi 2005; Rossetti and Choi 2008) have listed the mechanisms of cooperation to 
achieve a positive relationship, they have not provided a framework to help understand 
how this cooperative relationship could be achieved. This study argues that a positive and 
strong relationship (Gulati et al. 2012; Gulati et al. 2005; Gottschalg and Zollo 2007; 
Malone and Crowston 1994; Simatupang et al. 2002) in the triadic literature is achieved 
through two different set of cooperation mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms of action, and 
mechanisms of incentive. This is in harmony with the supply chain literature, in which, 
cooperation between different actors of a supply chain has been categorized into alignment 
of incentives and alignment of actions (Gulati et al. 2005). Drawing on this line of research, 
this study categorizes the cooperation mechanisms as mechanisms of incentive and 
mechanisms of action. 
 
2. 3. 2. Cooperation Mechanisms of Incentive 
According to agency theory, self-interest and opportunism motivate individual parties to 
take actions that are in line with their own private benefit rather than mutual benefit. 
Principal has to use mechanisms to incentivize the agent to perform in line with the goals 
of principal. The problem of cooperation in fact is a variant of the prisoner dilemma 
(Camerer and Knez 1996) and more specifically the agency problem (Eisenhardt 1989). 
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This problem could be resolved by aligning interest through incentive mechanisms (Gulati 
et al. 2005). 
Cooperation mechanisms of incentive or alignment of the interest in the organizational 
setting has been defined as “the degree to which the members of the organization are 
motivated to behave in line with organizational goals” (Gottschalg and Zollo 2007). In the 
supply chain literature alignment of interests has been defined as “joint pursuit of agreed-
on goal(s) in a manner corresponding to a shared understanding about contributions and 
payoffs” (Gulati et al. 2012). According to Gulati et al. (2005) when different parties in a 
social relationship have conflict of interest, they fail to achieve mutual positive outcomes. 
Mechanisms that have been proposed in the literature are contracting, common ownership 
of assets, monitoring, sanctions, and the prospect of future interactions (Gulati et al. 2005). 
 
2. 3. 3. Cooperation Mechanisms of Action 
Cooperation mechanisms of action address alignment of actions in the organization. They 
are defined as “the act of managing interdependencies between activities performed to 
achieve a goal” (Malone and Crowston 1994). In the supply chain literature this refers to 
harmonizing and adjusting a number of actions and decisions for achieving the supply 
chain goal (Simatupang et al. 2002). 
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Lack of alignment of actions is caused by the lack of shared knowledge about the decisions 
of the other party in the supply chain and how decisions and actions of one party will affect 
those of others. In other words, uncertainty about the rationality of other parties works 
against cooperation. According to agency theory, this problem is present when agents do 
not have enough knowledge about the interdependency of their actions but find them out 
through a bounded rational iterative process (Gulati et al. 2005). 
Mechanisms for alignment of actions are programming, hierarchy, and feedback, which 
improve the predictability of actions by other parties, and advance players’ knowledge 
about the interdependency of their actions (Gulati et al. 2005). 
 
2. 3. 4. Monitoring 
According to the agency theory, if left unmanaged by principal, goal incongruence will 
lead to opportunism of agent (Tosi, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 1997). One of the managing 
tools is the ability of principal to monitor agent. Monitoring helps principal to discover 
opportunistic behaviors and enforce penalties for such behaviors. Penalties may include 
termination of contract, monetary penalties, etc. (Rossetti and Choi 2008). According to 
agency theory, watchfulness of principal reduces the probability of opportunistic behavior 
by agent (Fama 1980).  
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The concept of losing the bridge position in a service triad (Li and Choi 2009), and the 
concept of supply chain disintermediation in the manufacturing triads (Rossetti and Choi 
2008), are in essence monitoring problems. Scholars argue that monitoring and enforcing 
penalties will reduce the opportunistic behavior of agent and acts as a solution for supply 
chain disintermediation (Rossetti and Choi 2008). Analogous to the same line of reasoning, 
and based on the agency theory, this study argues that in service triads, monitoring is an 
antecedent of permanent bridge decay in which the buyer does not completely lose control 
over the relationship between supplier and customer. 
 
2. 3. 5. Agency Theory in Purchasing IMDs 
Agency theory provides a dynamic view of the relationship between buyer, supplier, and 
customer (Rossetti and Choi 2008; van der Valk and van Iwaarden 2011). This theory is 
suitable for studies in which there is goal incongruence between principle and agent(s). As 
stated earlier, this theory has been recently applied to service triads (van der Valk and van 
Iwaarden 2011) to determine the type of contract and monitoring suitable for a triadic 
relationship in service setting. 
Focus of agency theory is on the type of contract and type of monitoring (Eisenhardt 1989). 
According to this theory different types of contract and different types of monitoring are 
proper for different tasks and measurability of their results (Eisenhardt 1989; van der Valk 
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and van Iwaarden 2011). Agency theory claims that based on bounded rationality, self-
interest, and difference in risk preference, agent(s) in most cases do not perform in the best 
interest of principal. 
Agency theory, when applied to the service settings (van der Valk and van Iwaarden 2011), 
serves as the theoretical foundation for the parts of conceptual model in this study. This 
model considers monitoring and contracts as effective ways to reduce or nullify the 
opportunistic behavior of vendor and physician, and align their goals with those of hospital. 
 
2. 4.  Conceptual Model 
This study proposes a conceptual model to investigate the antecedents and consequences 
of managing the IMD purchasing service triad by hospital. This framework also 
demonstrates the relationship between the mentioned parties and measures of hospital 
efficiency in reducing the total cost of ownership of IMDs as well as increasing the quality 
of them. 
Broadly speaking, this model proposes that certain mechanisms should be utilized by 
hospital to enhance its relationship with physician, and vendor. This model also states that 
maintaining these relationships has a positive effect on hospital performance in purchasing 
IMDs and IMD services. This model conceptualizes the relationships between physician 
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and hospital, and physician and vendor as principal-agent relationships. Physician is 
considered to be agent of hospital, as well as agent of vendor.  
This model states that when the physician acts as the agent of hospital, their relationship 
positively affect the efficiency of hospital in buying IMDs and achieving lower costs. On 
the contrary, this model argues that when physician acts as the agent of vendor, this 
relationship negatively affect the efficiency of hospital in buying IMDs and achieving 
lower costs and higher quality. This model proposes that hospital monitoring can mitigate 
the mentioned negative effect. This model also states that hospital can achieve higher 
efficiency in buying IMDs through standardization. The concept of standardization will be 
discussed in detail in the following sections. The conceptual model is illustrated in 
Figure 2-6. 
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Figure 2-6- Conceptual Model 
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In the following sections based on the above theoretical discussion and the proposed model, 
this study will propose the research hypotheses and offer theoretical and logical 
justification for them. Afterwards, this study defines all the constructs mentioned in the 
conceptual model and hypothesis. 
 
2. 5.  Hypotheses development 
In this section, hypotheses presented in the theoretical model are proposed. This study 
provides support for these hypotheses both from literature and practice. Logical reasoning 
behind hypotheses is also presented. 
 
2. 5. 1. Effect of Vendor Cooperation Mechanisms on Physician’s Agency 
“Vendor cooperation mechanisms for physician” in this study is defined as “Actions and 
incentives that vendor of IMDs takes to motivate physicians to perform in line with its 
objectives in selling IMDs and IMD services to hospital.” This study also defines physician 
as vendor’s agent as “the extent to which, in IMD and IMD services purchasing process, 
physician promotes vendor.” 
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According to agency theory when principal uses proper actions and incentives for 
cooperation, the level of goal alignment between the two parties increases (Eisenhardt 
1989). Following the same lead, vendor initiates action and incentives that align the goals 
of the physician with those of hospital.  
Vendor cooperation mechanisms for physician include to mechanisms such as payment 
model, contractual agreements, physician involvement in decision-making etc. These 
mechanisms align the goals of physicians with vendor, lead to more exchange of 
information, sharing knowledge, and finally increasing the level of trust between the two 
parties (Page et al. 2013; Burns and Muller 2008).  
Agency theory (Tosi et al. 1997) argues that in a proper contract, the compensation and 
reward system of agent is contingent upon his or her performance that is desired by 
principal. In this situation agent is more likely to show goal congruence with principal.  
Drawing on this line of reasoning, this study argues that according to agency theory, 
cooperation mechanisms are predictors of stronger agency role of physicians for vendor. 
 H1. Vendor cooperation mechanisms are positively associated with agency 
role of physician for vendor. 
 
2. 5. 2. Effect of Hospital Monitoring on Physician’s Agency 
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Hospital monitoring is defined as “The extent to which hospital screens the relationship 
between IMD vendor and physician.” As stated earlier in the section dedicated to the social 
network theory, the “permanent bridge decay” in this service triad is essentially the effect 
of hospital monitoring on controlling the principal-agent relationship between vendor and 
physician to keep it as weak as possible. 
According to agency theory (van der Valk and van Iwaarden 2011; Eisenhardt 1989) 
monitoring is an inseparable part of relationship management (Heide et al. 2007). 
Monitoring enables principle (hospital) to prevent and control the opportunistic behaviors 
of agent (physician). Literature in the agency theory (van der Valk and van Iwaarden 2011) 
posits that proper type of monitoring is necessary in a service triad. 
According to Social network theory and studies that use this theory in the context of service 
triads (Burt 1992; Li and Choi 2009), monitoring the relationship between supplier (vendor 
of IMDs) and customer (physician) is an essential element of managing the triadic 
relationship. Scholars (Burns et al. 2009; Li and Choi 2009) assert that monitoring these 
two parties and their relationship, helps hospital to stay in the state of permanent bridge 
decay in the clinical setting. The permanent bridge decay in the purchasing IMDs is 
essentially the effect of hospital monitoring on keeping the principal-agent relationship 
between vendor and physician as weak as possible. 
According to agency theory (van der Valk and van Iwaarden 2011; Eisenhardt 1989), in a 
service triad where buyer purchases a service for its customer, monitoring helps buyer to 
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prevent supplier and customer to conspire against the buyer. Proper type of monitoring 
(van der Valk and van Iwaarden 2011) assists buyer in determining situations in which 
buyer is being dis-intermediated (Rossetti and Choi 2008) or forced to buy a product or 
service that is not economically reasonable. Scholars (Li and Choi 2009) believe that 
monitoring supplier (vendor of IMDs), customer (physician), and their relationship helps 
buyer (hospital) to maintain a state of permanent bridge decay.  
Based on the social network theory (Li and Choi 2009), maintaining permanent bridge 
decay helps buyer to retain its “tertius gaudens” position i.e. hospital would be the third 
who enjoys the benefits of lack of relationship between the other two parties. In the context 
of this study, by sustaining the permanent bridge decay position, hospital continually 
watches both vendor and physician, and their principal-agent relationship. For instance, 
hospital can utilize public records (Wilson 2014) to find out about the financial relationship 
between vendor and physician. 
As stated earlier, it might not look like a great solution, but it is by far better than leaving 
everything to physician and vendor and giving up the leverage of “tertius” or “bridge” 
position.  
H2a. Hospital monitoring on the relationship between physician and vendor 
is negatively associated with the agency role of physician for vendor. 
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H2b. Hospital monitoring on the relationship between physician and vendor 
is positively associated with the agency role of physician for hospital. 
 
2. 5. 3. Effects of Hospital Cooperation Mechanisms 
As stated earlier, cooperation mechanisms are essentially the incentives and actions that 
hospital considers to persuade vendor and physician to work in line with the goals of 
hospital. These cooperation mechanisms intend to motivate vendor and physician to 
cooperate with hospital to achieve hospital goals in connection with purchasing IMDs. 
Drawing on the same line of reasoning and literature provided for the first hypothesis, and 
according to agency theory (Eisenhardt 1989; van der Valk and van Iwaarden 2011), this 
study argues that hospital cooperation mechanisms for vendor lead to a positive and strong 
relationships between hospital and vendor. Likewise, hospital cooperation mechanisms for 
physician lead to stronger principal-agent relationship between hospital and physician. 
Therefore this study hypothesizes that: 
H3a. Hospital cooperation mechanisms for physician are positively 
associated with higher agency role of physician for hospital. 
H3b. Hospital cooperation mechanisms for vendor are positively associated 
with strong buyer-supplier relationship between hospital and vendor. 
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2. 5. 4. Physician’s Agency Role for Hospital and for Vendor 
Classic agency theory (Eisenhardt 1989) investigates the single principle-agent problem in 
detail. Later, studies expanded this theory to apply to multiple principals (Bernheim and 
Whinston 1986). These studies refer to a situation in which one agent is in relationship 
with two principals, as “common agency”. In such a situation, economic models suggest 
that since agent is expected to increase its benefit, it leans toward the principal that offers 
better pays. The stronger principal-agent relationship negatively affects the weaker 
principal-agent relationship. In other words, when multiple principals interact with a 
common agent, the richest relationship remains and the others vanish (Bernheim and 
Whinston 1986). Also, according to balance theory (Simmel 1950) and studies of triad built 
on this theory (Choi and Wu 2009), when customer (physician) is well treated by buyer 
(hospital), customer (physician) becomes reluctant in its relationship with sub-contractor 
or supplier (vendor). Therefore this study hypothesizes: 
H4. Agency role of physician for hospital is negatively associated with the 
agency role of physician for vendor. 
 
2. 5. 5. Effect of Agency Role of Physician on Standardization of IMDs 
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In this study standardization has been defined as “the extent to which hospital has standard 
processes for managing, controlling, and coordinating the purchasing process of orthopedic 
and cardiac implantable medical devices.”  
Several studies (Burns et al. 2009; Montgomery and Schneller 2007; Transparency Market 
Research 2013; Streit et al. 2012) referred to the fact that one of main barriers against cost-
containment strategies of hospitals is the strong relationship between physicians and 
manufacturers. In other words, when physician acts as the agent of vendor, it defends 
vendor’s position and tries to convince hospital to pay higher prices and purchase implants 
from various vendors. This situation is in complete contrast with the standardization 
strategies. Same studies argue that when physician has aligned goals with hospital, i.e. acts 
as the hospital agent, it defends hospital stakes in purchasing implants and actively 
participate in value analysis teams (VAT) to speak on behalf of hospital and helps to 
implement standardization strategies. 
Also, according to “common agency” model, which has been discussed earlier (Bernheim 
and Whinston 1986) these two agency relationships are expected to work in opposite 
directions. In other words the principal-agent relationship between physician and vendor 
has adversarial effect on hospital initiatives for standardization, while the principal-agent 
relationship between physician and hospital has positive effect on hospital initiatives for 
standardization. Therefore this study hypothesizes: 
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H5a. Agency role of physician for vendor is negatively associated with IMD 
standardization. 
H5b. Agency role of physician for hospital is positively associated with IMD 
standardization. 
 
2. 5. 6. Effect of Hospital-Vendor Relationship on Standardization of IMDs 
This study defines hospital-vendor relationship as “the extent to which, in purchasing 
process interactions, hospital trusts vendor for quality and price of IMDs and services 
rendered by vendor, vendor and hospital do not abuse their market power, and openly 
communicate relevant and required information.” 
Scholars (Montgomery and Schneller 2007) refer to such a positive relationship as a strong 
predictor of success of hospitals in implementing standardization strategies. For instance 
when vendor and hospital have such a relationship, vendors provides hospitals with 
updated information on new product availability and FDA approvals. Vendor also assures 
hospital that they can provide the required quality of IMDs to meet hospital needs. In 
return, hospital commits to work with a particular vendor for appropriate price. Vendor 
facilitates hospital IMD inventory management (Rosales et al. 2014). Vendor provides 
inventory on a JIT basis on the day of surgery. This close cooperation, the culture of trust 
between the two parties, exchange of critical information, and more importantly not 
abusing the market power, will enable hospital to have a vivid view of the dynamics of the 
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IMD market. In other words hospital has a clear visibility across the upstream of its supply 
chain (Barratt and Oke 2007). This enables hospital administration and procurement 
managers to swiftly respond to changes in the market, and take actions to reconfigure the 
supply base. In other words hospital makes better decisions in renewing the contract with 
current vendor, switching to another vendor, use multiple vendors, and changing the price 
cap strategy. Drawing on this line of reasoning, this study hypothesizes: 
H5c. Hospital-Vendor relationship is positively associated with IMD 
standardization. 
 
 
2. 5. 7. Effect of IMD Standardization on the Performance 
This study defines performance as the extent to which the total cost of ownership of a 
cardiac and orthopedic IMD is proportionate to the quality of IMD; and utilization of this 
IMD enhances the quality of care, e.g. reduces the length of stay, reduces the surgery site 
infections, and increases the rate of progress in gaining experience and knowledge among 
clinicians. 
Studies on standardization of physician preference items (PPI) (Obremskey et al. 2012; 
Lerner et al. 2008; Montgomery and Schneller 2007) state that standardization of IMDs 
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streamlines the flow of information, eliminates waste, and improves the efficiency and 
quality in purchasing PPIs.  
These studies argue that different models of standardization of IMDs, e.g. payment cap and 
reducing the number of suppliers, increase the performance. In other words by 
implementing standardization strategies, hospitals will gain lower prices and required 
quality of IMDs. Therefore this study hypothesizes: 
H6. Standardization of implantable medical devices is positively associated 
with performance. 
 
 
 
2. 6.  Construct Definition 
In this section constructs that form the theoretical model and hypotheses will be defined. 
These constructs address cooperation mechanisms, hospital monitoring, parties’ 
relationships, standardization, and performance. Following sections cover the 
conceptualization of the mentioned constructs followed by tables containing the detailed 
definition of each construct. 
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2. 6. 1. Cooperation Mechanisms 
As stated above drawing on the agency theory (Eisenhardt 1989), one of the main problems 
in the setting of this study is lack of goal congruence. Scholars (Rossetti and Choi 2008; 
Gulati et al. 2012; Berenson et al. 2007) proposed that the problem of goal incongruence 
between principal and agent(s), i.e. hospital, vendor, and physician, could be solved by 
different methods of cooperation (Berenson et al. 2007; Gulati et al. 2012; Modi and 
Mabert 2007). For instance some recent studies (Dobrzykowski and Tarafdar 2015) show 
that higher levels of coordination mechanisms e.g. in the form of information exchange 
between physician and other entities in hospital affect the efforts of hospital in gaining 
higher patient satisfaction through using electronic medical record systems (EMRS). In 
other words, if physicians, who conventionally are observed as independent entities with 
free agenda in hospitals (Dobrzykowski and Tarafdar 2015), do not coordinate with 
hospital, many efforts of hospital could possibly go in vain. In particular a hospital that has 
invested a lot in the electronic medical record systems has to put coordination mechanisms 
in place to have physicians on board with its initiatives. Otherwise, these systems will not 
be effective (Dobrzykowski and Tarafdar 2015). 
Another theory that serves as the backbone of defining cooperation mechanisms is the 
relational coordination theory (Gittell 2002). This coordination is constituted of three 
coordination mechanisms. These mechanisms are shared goal, shared knowledge, and 
mutual respect for work. Shared goal motivates individuals to act in line with the overall 
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efficiency of processes. Shared knowledge provides feedback to people on how their work 
affects others productivity. Mutual respect serves as a driver for individuals to work in line 
with goals of organization. Scholars (Dobrzykowski 2010), believe that relational 
coordination, in healthcare setting, is associated with higher quality in managing processes, 
and utilizing different techniques to provide higher quality of care.  
Drawing on this line of research this study proposes certain cooperation mechanisms that 
hospital can use to reduce the goal incongruence and incentivize vendor and physician 
(agents) to act in line with the objectives of hospital in the context of purchasing IMDs. 
This study conceptualizes hospital cooperation mechanisms as Hospital Cooperation 
Mechanisms for Physician, and Hospital Cooperation Mechanisms for Vendor. Definitions 
of this construct have been provided in Table 2-1 and Table 2-2. 
Table 2-1- Hospital Cooperation Mechanisms for Physician 
Construct Definition 
Adapted from 
Reference(s) 
Hospital 
Cooperation 
Mechanisms for 
Physician 
Actions and incentives that hospital takes to 
motivate physicians to perform in line with 
the hospital objectives in purchasing IMDs 
and IMD services, i.e. balanced quality and 
cost. 
(Dobrzykowski 
and Tarafdar 
2015; Gulati et al. 
2005; Gulati et al. 
2012) 
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Construct Definition 
Adapted from 
Reference(s) 
Example: Hospital supports physician by 
providing well-trained nurses and 
convenient OR blocks. Hospital involves 
physician in making decisions. Hospital 
involves physicians in Value Analysis 
Teams (VAT), and values their decisions in 
assessing IMDs and vendor service. 
Hospital implements gain sharing programs 
for physicians. 
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Table 2-2 - Hospital Cooperation Mechanisms for Vendor 
Construct Definition 
Adapted from 
Reference(s) 
Hospital 
Cooperation 
Mechanisms for 
Vendor 
Action and incentives that hospital takes 
to motivate vendor to perform in line with 
the hospital objectives in purchasing 
IMDs and IMD services. 
Example: Hospital has mutual 
investments with vendor. Hospital has 
open communication channels with 
vendor to receive updated information. 
Hospital arranges frequent meetings 
between vendors and hospital 
procurement team. 
(Handfield & 
Bechtel, 2002; S. 
M. L. Lee, D.H.; 
Schniederjans, 
M.J., 2011) 
 
Next cooperation mechanisms are Vendor Cooperation Mechanisms for Physicians. As 
stated earlier vendors try hard to make physicians a member of their team. In doing so, they 
use different mechanisms. In this study, these mechanisms are reflected in a construct 
labeled Vendor Cooperation Mechanisms for Physicians. Definition of this construct is 
offered in Table 2-3. 
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Table 2-3- Vendor Cooperation Mechanisms for Physician 
Construct Definition 
Adapted from 
Reference(s) 
Vendor 
Cooperation 
Mechanisms for 
Physicians 
Actions and incentives that vendor of IMDs 
takes to motivate physicians to perform in 
line with its objectives in selling IMDs and 
IMD services to hospital. 
(Gulati et al. 2005; 
Gulati et al. 2012) 
Example: Physicians receive financial 
remuneration from vendor in exchange of 
consulting, royalties for patents, and 
honoraria for speeches. Physician receives 
research grants from vendor in exchange of 
endorsing vendor and higher utilization of 
its IMDs. Vendor provides the physician 
(who promotes the vendor service) with 
high quality training and support. 
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2. 6. 2. Hospital Monitoring 
According to agency theory (Eisenhardt 1989; van der Valk and van Iwaarden 2011) 
monitoring is an inseparable part of the effective relationship between principal and 
agent(s). Scholars who used agency theory (van der Valk and van Iwaarden 2011) and 
social network theory (Li and Choi 2009) in service triads, argue that monitoring is an 
essential task of focal company, i.e. buyer to prevent opportunism of other parties i.e. 
supplier and customer. They also argue that effective monitoring prevents buyer from being 
secluded or bypassed (van der Valk and van Iwaarden 2011; Li and Choi 2009). 
Scholars in social network theory (Li and Choi 2009) argue that, in a service setting, buyer 
(Hospital in this study) should closely monitor the vendor (IMD Vendor in this study), 
customer (Physician in this study), and the relationship between them. They assert that: 
“The buyer should focus on three loci of control: the supplier, its customers, and the 
relationship between the supplier and the customers.” In the context of this study, hospital 
can guard against the rising leverage of vendor, and possible collusion between vendor and 
physician, by continually monitoring physician, vendor, and the relationship between them. 
According to agency theory, monitoring has been defined as “observation of an agent's 
effort or outcomes that is accomplished through supervision, accounting controls, and other 
devices.” (Tosi et al. 1997). Based on the same theoretical framework, other scholars have 
defined monitoring as “an effort made by one party to measure or “meter” the performance 
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of another.” (Heide et al. 2007). Scholars explain that in agency theory literature two types 
of monitoring have been defined. “Output monitoring involves measuring the visible 
consequences of a partner’s actions, such as a supplier’s delivery time, order accuracy, and 
product quality.” They continue that the other type of monitoring, which is more intrusive 
and strict, is behavior monitoring. They state “behavior monitoring involves evaluating the 
processes that are expected to produce the focal outcomes.” (Heide et al. 2007). 
Drawing on the above works, this study proposes the following definition for hospital 
monitoring on physician and vendor relationship. Hospital monitoring on physician and 
vendor relationship is “The extent to which hospital screens the relationship between IMD 
vendor and physician.” This definition has been provided in Table 2-4. 
 
Table 2-4- Hospital Monitoring on P-V Relationship 
Construct Definition 
Adapted from 
Reference(s) 
Hospital 
Monitoring on P-V 
Relationship 
The extent to which hospital screens the 
relationship between IMD vendor and 
physician. 
(Li and Choi 
2009; Heide et 
al. 2007; Tosi et 
al. 1997; van der 
Valk and van 
Iwaarden 2011) 
Example: Hospital reviews the available 
public records about the financial relationship 
between P-V. This could be done through 
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Construct Definition 
Adapted from 
Reference(s) 
means like Sunshine act for teaching hospitals, 
etc. Hospital also asks physicians to declare if 
they have any mutual financial interest with 
vendor. 
 
2. 6. 3. Physician as Hospital’s Agent 
This study observes the relationship between hospital and physician as a principal-agent 
relationship. As stated earlier, in this role physician acts as the agent of the hospital and is 
supposed to safeguard the interests of the hospital. This conceptualization also entails the 
principal-agent problem, which will be discussed in the hypothesis development section. 
This study defines this construct as “The extent to which, in the process of vendor selection 
and evaluation, physician has cost and quality concerns similar to those of hospital. 
Physician defends hospital stakes in these negotiations.” This definition along with its 
examples is provided in Table 2-5. 
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Table 2-5- Physician as Hospital’s Agent 
Construct Definition 
Adapted from 
Reference(s) 
Physician as 
Hospital’s Agent  
The extent to which, in the process of vendor 
selection and evaluation, physician has cost 
and quality concerns similar to those of 
hospital. Physician defends hospital stakes in 
these negotiations. 
(Gulati et al. 2005; 
Schneller et al. 
2006; Gulati et al. 
2012; Montgomery 
and Schneller 2007) 
Example:  Physician speaks on behalf of 
hospital in procurement negotiations to 
purchase IMDs and IMD services. Physician 
uses his/her professional and academic 
knowledge to defend hospital’s stakes in 
price negotiations. 
 
 
2. 6. 4. Physician as Vendor’s Agent 
Physician in this service triad also has a principal-agent relationship with vendor. In this 
role vendor expects physician to defend vendor’s chips in price negotiations. This entails 
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the principal-agent problem, which will be discussed later in the hypotheses section. 
Moreover, there is a conflict between physician’s agency role for vendor and hospital. This 
study argues that these two roles are conflicting. This study defines “Physician as Vendor’s 
Agent” as “the extent to which, in IMD and IMD services purchasing process, physician 
promotes vendor.” This definition along with an example is provided in Table 2-6. 
 
Table 2-6- Physician as Vendor's Agent 
Construct Definition 
Adapted from 
Reference(s) 
Physician as 
Vendor’s Agent  
The extent to which, in IMD and IMD 
services purchasing process, physician 
promotes vendor. (Montgomery and 
Schneller 2007; 
Burns et al. 2009) 
Example: Physician speaks on behalf of 
vendor in procurement negotiations, and 
threatens hospital to take his/her business to 
another hospital if the vendor is not selected. 
 
 
2. 6. 5. Hospital Vendor Relationship 
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The third side of the service triad in purchasing IMDs and IMD services is the relationship 
between hospital and vendor. This study conceptualizes this relationship as a buyer-
supplier relationship in the service setting. Characteristics of a healthy relationship between 
these two entities include but are not limited to trust, information sharing, and not abusing 
market power (Gulati et al. 2012). This study defines this constructs as “The extent to 
which, in purchasing process interactions, hospital rely on vendor for the optimum balance 
of quality and price of IMDs and IMD services, vendor and hospital do not abuse their 
market power, and they openly communicate relevant and required information.” This 
definition along with an example is presented in Table 2-7. 
 
Table 2-7- Hospital Vendor Relationship 
Construct Definition 
Adapted from 
Reference(s) 
Hospital-Vendor 
Relationship 
The extent to which, in purchasing process 
interactions, hospital rely on vendor for the 
optimum balance of quality and price of 
IMDs and IMD services, vendor and hospital 
do not abuse their market power, and they 
openly communicate relevant and required 
information. 
(Gulati et al. 2005; 
Gulati et al. 2012; 
Montgomery and 
Schneller 2007; 
Schneller et al. 
2006) 
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Construct Definition 
Adapted from 
Reference(s) 
Example: Vendors provide hospitals with 
updated information on new product 
availability and FDA approvals. Vendors 
assure hospital that they can provide the 
required quality of IMDs to meet hospital 
needs. Hospital commits to use a particular 
vendor in return for appropriate price. 
Vendors facilitate hospital IMD inventory 
management. They provide inventory on a 
JIT basis on the day of surgery. 
 
2. 6. 6. Standardization of IMDs 
In order to reduce the cost of implantable medical devices and their services, hospital needs 
to implement cost containment strategies. One of main strategies that fit the characteristics 
of the IMDs is standardization (Montgomery and Schneller 2007). In fact, standardization 
is intended to limit the choice in one way or another. There are different standardization 
models for physician preference items (PPIs). For instance formulary model, and price cap 
model are two well-studied models (Montgomery and Schneller 2007). 
66 
 
“The formulary model restricts the number of choices of manufacturers from which 
physician preference items are purchased or of the range of products that are bought for a 
given procedure.” (Montgomery and Schneller 2007)  
“The payment-cap model does not explicitly restrict particular products or manufacturers 
but instead standardizes costs by restricting the price paid for products in a particular 
category.” (Montgomery and Schneller 2007) 
This study defines standardization of IMDs as “The extent to which hospital has standard 
processes for managing, controlling, and coordinating the purchasing process of orthopedic 
and cardiac implantable medical devices.” This definition, along with an example is offered 
in Table 2-8. 
Table 2-8- Standardization of IMDs 
Construct Definition 
Adapted from 
Reference(s) 
Standardization of 
IMDs 
The extent to which hospital has standard 
processes for managing, controlling, and 
coordinating the purchasing process of 
orthopedic and cardiac implantable medical 
devices.  
(Montgomery 
and Schneller 
2007) 
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Construct Definition 
Adapted from 
Reference(s) 
Example: Hospital is able to “orchestrate” the 
process of purchasing cardiac and orthopedic 
IMDs through implementing strategies like 
“price cap” model and “formulary” model. 
 
2. 6. 7. Performance 
One of the main ultimate goals of the hospital in purchasing implantable medical devices 
is balancing the cost and quality (Burns et al. 2009). In other words, hospital should put 
every effort to reduce the cost of IMDs and their relevant procedures, while maintaining 
the required standard quality of care. One of the main effects of the relationship s in the 
procurement triad in the proposed model is on the cost containment.  
Recently scholars, practitioners, and legislative authorities tend to have a more holistic 
approach towards cost containment in healthcare. In other words, the focus has moved from 
just being concerned about the unit price to the total cost of care. According to a report 
(National Quality Forum (NQF) 2009), “Cost of care is a measure of the total healthcare 
spending, including total resource use and unit price(s), by payer or consumer, for a 
healthcare service or group of healthcare services, associated with a specified patient 
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population, time period, and unit(s) of clinical accountability.” Some scholars have defined 
cost of care by just focusing on some other aspects of healthcare delivery. According to 
them (Li and Benton 2003) “health care cost measurement focuses on holding down patient 
cost, achieving high labor productivity, and maintaining higher capacity utilization levels.” 
Other scholars have (Burns et al. 2009) focused on the unit price of specific implantable 
medical devises and proposed methods to keep the cost of these items as low as possible. 
Drawing on the previous works (Montgomery and Schneller 2007), they argued that 
hospitals have to “standardize implant choice using a smaller number of vendors and 
thereby negotiate lower implant prices (formulary model), or persuade vendors to agree to 
price ceilings (payment cap model). 
Drawing on the above works, this study proposes the following definition for performance: 
“The extent to which the total cost of ownership of a cardiac and orthopedic IMD is 
proportionate to the quality of IMD; and utilization of this IMD enhances the quality of 
care, e.g. reduces the length of stay, reduces the surgery site infections, and increases the 
rate of progress in gaining experience and knowledge among clinicians.” This has been 
reflected in Table 2-9. 
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Table 2-9- Performance 
Construct Definition 
Adapted from 
Reference(s) 
Performance 
The extent to which the total cost of ownership 
of a cardiac and orthopedic IMD is 
proportionate to the quality of IMD; and 
utilization of this IMD enhances the quality of 
care, e.g. reduces the length of stay, reduces the 
surgery site infections, and increases the rate of 
progress in gaining experience and knowledge 
among clinicians. 
 (Ding, 2014; 
Institute of 
Medicine, 
2001) 
 
 
 
 
2. 6. 8. Control Variables 
Drawing on prior studies (Dobrzykowski 2010; Burns et al. 2009; Page et al. 2013; 
Montgomery and Schneller 2007; Cullen et al. 2012; Berenson and Rich 2010) in this field, 
and based on the structured interviews with academicians and clinicians, this study has 
identified a number of control variables. Rational and justification for selecting these 
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control variables for this study is provided. Some of these control variables are 
characteristics of the hospital i.e. size, teaching status, ownership, reputation, and market 
share. Other control variables are the level of competition among vendors in the IMD 
market, the level of hospital dependence on vendor, and physician employment status. This 
study also controls for direct-to customer (physician) marketing by vendor. Finally, this 
study controls the social desirability of the respondents to offset the common method bias. 
This study states that size and reputation of hospital affects the level of motivation of 
physicians or vendors to cooperate with the hospital. For instance vendors are more willing 
to be suppliers of a giant heath system. Similarly physicians find it favorable to be affiliated 
with a highly reputable hospital, or a hospital that has a higher market share. Moreover, 
type of hospital, e.g. for profit, not for profit, university hospital, and non-university 
hospital, affects the approach of hospital to manage the mentioned triads, and the extent to 
which physicians are involved in leadership. Employment status of physicians heavily 
affects the way they act as the agent of either hospital or vendor. For instance scholars 
(Dobrzykowski and Tarafdar 2015) argue that among the employed physicians there is a 
higher relationship between the use of electronic medical records, and social interaction 
ties, which in turn increase the level of coordination. Detailed definitions of control 
variables are summarized in Table 2-10. 
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Table 2-10- Control Variables 
Construct Definition 
Adapted from 
Reference(s) 
Hospital Size 
The number of beds, which a hospital has been 
designed and constructed to contain. 
(Li 2006) 
Hospital Teaching 
Status 
Teaching / Non-Teaching (Li 2006) 
Hospital 
Ownership 
For Profit / Not For Profit, Public 
(Yuan et al. 
2000) 
Complexity  
Complexity is measured with the proxy of 
Hospital Case Mix Index. Case mix index refers 
to the sum total of the diagnoses (diseases) 
present in a population, and high- and low-
resource therapies required to manage them, 
considered as a single unit for the purpose of 
resource analysis and allocation planning. 
(Carter et al. 
1990) 
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Construct Definition 
Adapted from 
Reference(s) 
Quality  
Quality is measured with the proxy of Hospital 
Reputation. Hospital perception of public 
judgment about the ability of hospital to deliver 
high quality of care and willingness of 
physicians to practice at the hospital.  
(Hibbard et al. 
2005) 
Physician 
Employment 
Status 
The extent to which the cardiac and orthopedic 
physicians who work in the hospital are 
independent from hospital. 
Interviews 
(Burns et al. 
2009)  
Hospital Market 
Share 
The portion of cardiac and orthopedic IMD 
procedures market controlled by the hospital. 
(Hibbard et al. 
2005) 
Vendor 
Competition 
The extent to which different vendors 
manufacture similar type of specific IMDs.  
(Handfield and 
Bechtel 2002) 
Hospital 
Dependence on 
Vendor 
The extent to which hospital considers vendor 
as its only source of input, or key supplier of 
IMDs, e.g. vendors has a unique product which 
is currently protected by patent. 
(Handfield and 
Bechtel 2002) 
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Construct Definition 
Adapted from 
Reference(s) 
Vendor’s Direct-
to-Consumer 
Marketing 
Hospital perception of the extent to which 
vendor convinces physicians about superiority 
of their product through means such as 
advertisement and research publication.   
Interviews 
(Ogunwale et 
al. 2009) 
Social Desirability 
of Respondents 
“Social desirability in an experiment occurs 
when a participant responds in accordance to 
social norms, or in a manner in which they 
believe the researcher would desire, rather than 
how they truly feel or believe.” 
(Crowne and 
Marlowe 1960) 
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Chapter 3 
3. Instrument Development 
In this chapter a valid and reliable measurement instrument is developed for the constructs 
that have been used in the conceptual model. Scholars argue that development of an 
effective measurement comprises of four distinct steps. These steps are item generation, 
pre-test and structured interviews, pilot study and Q-sort, and finally large-scale data 
analysis and instrument validation (Dillman 2000). 
In item generation step, measurement items for all the constructs are developed. This step 
is done via an extensive literature review. Next step is the pre-test and structured 
interviews. This is mainly performed to improve the content validity of the items. A 
systematic interview with academic experts and industry specialists performs to ensure the 
desired level of content validity. Next, pilot study and Q-sort is performed to ensure the 
discriminant validity and convergent validity of the measurement instrument (Moore and 
Benbasat 1991). 
Finally, the large-scale data analysis is performed to evaluate the instrument reliability and 
validity. This step is not included in this chapter and is explained in detail in chapter four. 
3. 1.  Item Generation 
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The conceptual model proposed in this study, entails nine main constructs. Initial 
measurement items have been generated via an extensive literature review or adapted from 
extant literature with minor modification. Appendix B shows these measurement items and 
their relevant references in the literature. All measurement items have undergone the pre-
test and structured interview process of validation. 
3. 2.  Pre-Test and Structured Interviews 
In order to warrant the content validity of measurement instrument, this study asked a group 
of six academicians and practitioners, familiar with purchasing IMDs, to evaluate the 
correctness, and precision of the instrument. Based on the input received from these experts 
the initial measurement items are modified. 
Thereafter, a structured interview is performed with another group of five academicians 
and practitioners, to evaluate the definition of constructs, as well as the revised 
measurement items. According to their feedback the measurement items are further 
revised. Finally the revised instrument and definitions are considered appropriate for the 
pilot study. (Detailed items used in the pilot study are reported in Appendix C). 
3. 3.  Q-sort 
This study employs Q-sort method (Thomas & Watson, 2002) to test the measurement 
instrument. The Q-sort is implemented by participation of a group of academicians and 
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healthcare professionals. This method is widely used in social science to measure the 
perception of respondents (Stephenson 1953). 
First, the general idea of the research, problem statement, and the conceptual model is 
explained to the participants. Then, a shuffled set of items is distributed to them (Nahm et 
al. 2002), and they have been asked to categorize these items under different construct 
definitions. (Detailed method is provided in Appendix C). Brainstorming, questions, and 
discussions between the researcher and experts during this process improve the quality of 
work. Finally according to the input received during Q-sort, measurement items are further 
modified. This study repeats this process for two rounds, and finally items that survive the 
Q-sort, shape the final instrument. All questions employ a seven point Likert scale (Vagias 
2006). 
3. 3. 1.  Assessment of Q-sort Results 
This study evaluates the results of Q-sort study using three different indices. The first index 
is inter-judge raw agreement score. Second index is the placement ratio. Finally the third 
index is Cohen’s Kappa (Moore and Benbasat 1991). 
Inter-judge raw agreement score is calculated as follows: 
Inter Rater Raw Agreement Score = 
𝐓𝐨𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐍𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐈𝐭𝐞𝐦𝐬 𝐀𝐠𝐫𝐞𝐞𝐝 𝐮𝐩𝐨𝐧 𝐛𝐲 𝐁𝐨𝐭𝐡 𝐉𝐮𝐝𝐠𝐞𝐬
𝐓𝐨𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐍𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐈𝐭𝐞𝐦𝐬
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The placement ratio is the second metric that this study uses to evaluate the results of the 
Q sort. This index measures the consistency of classification of categories between judges. 
The formula for calculating placement ratio is shown below:  
Placement Ratio = 
∑ 𝐓𝐨𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐍𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐈𝐭𝐞𝐦𝐬 𝐀𝐠𝐫𝐞𝐞𝐝 𝐮𝐩𝐨𝐧 𝐛𝐲 𝐉𝐮𝐝𝐠𝐞 𝐢𝒏𝒊=𝟏
𝒏∗ 𝐓𝐨𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐍𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐈𝐭𝐞𝐦𝐬
 
Finally, this study uses Cohen’s Kappa as the most robust statistical measurement of the 
agreement between judges (Cohen 1968, 1960; Thomas and Watson 2002). Cohen’s Kappa 
provides a sufficient evaluation of convergent validity within each construct, and 
discriminant validity among constructs (Davis 1989). In contrast to other methods, this 
method has a comprehensive approach to the agreement between judges. It “quantifies the 
extent to which the observed agreement that the observers achieved exceeds that which 
would be expected by chance alone, and expresses it as a proportion of the maximum 
improvement that can occur beyond the agreement expected by chance alone” (Gordis 
2009): 104 
The formula for calculating Cohen’s Kappa is shown below:  
𝜿 =
𝑷𝒓 (𝒂) −  𝑷𝒓 (𝒆)
𝟏 − 𝑷𝒓 (𝒆)
 
In this formula, Pr(a) is the relative observed agreement among judges, and Pr(e) is the 
hypothetical probability of chance agreement, which uses the observed data to calculate 
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the probabilities of each observer randomly saying each category. When raters are in total 
agreement kappa is equal to 1, whereas when they are in complete disagreement kappa will 
equal to 0 (Cohen 1960, 1968). Conventionally values of kappa above 0.8 show perfect 
agreement between the judges. Table 3-1 shows the meaning of other values of Cohen’s 
Kappa (Landis and Koch 1977). 
Table 3-1- Interpretation of Cohen Kappa 
Cohen’s Kappa Interpretation 
<0.00 No agreement 
0.0-0.19 Poor agreement 
0.20-0.39 Fair agreement 
0.40-0.59 Moderate agreement 
0.80-1.00 Nearly Perfect agreement 
Adapted from: Landis and Koch (1977) 
3. 4.  First Round of Q-Sort 
In the first round of Q-sort, all 90 initial items placed into the constructs entered the Q-sort 
study (Table 3-3), and judges agreed on 87 items (Table 3-4). Judges job title, years of 
experience and education are shown in Table 3-2. 
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Table 3-2- Q-Sort Judges Job Title, Education Level, and Experience 
Judge Job Title Education Level 
Years of 
Experience 
Judge No. 1 (1st Round) Professor of surgery Medical Doctor, Surgeon 8 Years 
Judge No. 2  (1st Round) Surgeon Medical Doctor, Surgeon 10 Years 
Judge No. 1 (2nd Round) Operating Room Director Medical Doctor, Critical Care 11Years 
Judge No. 2  (2nd Round) Professor of Surgery Medical Doctor, Surgeon 12 Years 
 
 
 
Table 3-3-  Items for First Round of Q Sort 
No. Construct Initial Number of Items 
1 Vendor Cooperation Mechanisms for Physician 11 
2 Hospital Monitoring on P-V Relationship 7 
3 Hospital Cooperation Mechanisms for Physician  9 
4 Hospital Cooperation Mechanisms for Vendor  8 
5 Physician as Vendor’s Agent 8 
6 Physician as Hospital's Agent 9 
7 Hospital Vendor Relationship 9 
8 Standardization of IMDs’ Purchasing Process 5 
9 Performance 6 
10 Hospital Ownership Status 1 
11 Hospital Location (Rural/Urban) 1 
12 Hospital Teaching Status 1 
13 Hospital Size 1 
14 Complexity (Case Mix Index) 1 
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No. Construct Initial Number of Items 
15 Quality (Hospital Reputation) 1 
16 Physician Employment Status 1 
17 Hospital Market Share 1 
18 Vendor Competition 1 
19 Hospital Dependence on Vendor 1 
20 Vendor’s Direct-to-Consumer Marketing 3 
21 Social Desirability Scale 5 
  Total Number of Items 90 
 
 
Table 3-4- First Round of Q Sort 
Round 1 
Judge 1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1
0 
1
1 
1
2 
1
3 
1
4 
1
5 
1
6 
1
7 
1
8 
1
9 
2
0 
2
1 
N
A 
J
u
d
g
e
 2
 
1 
1
0                   1                       
2   7                                         
3     9                                       
4       8                                     
5         8                                   
6           9                                 
7             8                             1 
8               5                             
9                 5         1                 
10                   1                         
11                     1                       
12                       1                     
13                         1                   
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Round 1 
Judge 1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1
0 
1
1 
1
2 
1
3 
1
4 
1
5 
1
6 
1
7 
1
8 
1
9 
2
0 
2
1 
N
A 
14                           1                 
15                             1               
16                               1             
17                                 1           
18                                   1         
19                                     1       
20                                       3     
21                                         5   
N
A                                             
Total No. of placement: 90 Number of Agreement: 87 
3. 4. 1. Calculation for the First Round 
Inter Rater Raw Agreement Score = 
𝐓𝐨𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐍𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐈𝐭𝐞𝐦𝐬 𝐀𝐠𝐫𝐞𝐞𝐝 𝐮𝐩𝐨𝐧 𝐛𝐲 𝐁𝐨𝐭𝐡 𝐉𝐮𝐝𝐠𝐞𝐬
𝐓𝐨𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐍𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐈𝐭𝐞𝐦𝐬
 
Inter Rater Raw Agreement Score = 0.889 
Placement Ratio = 
∑ 𝐓𝐨𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐍𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐈𝐭𝐞𝐦𝐬 𝐀𝐠𝐫𝐞𝐞𝐝 𝐮𝐩𝐨𝐧 𝐛𝐲 𝐉𝐮𝐝𝐠𝐞 𝐢𝒏𝒊=𝟏
𝒏∗ 𝐓𝐨𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐍𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐈𝐭𝐞𝐦𝐬
 
Placement Ratio = 0.906 
 
Cohen’s Kappa 
𝜿 =
𝑷𝒓 (𝒂) −  𝑷𝒓 (𝒆)
𝟏 − 𝑷𝒓 (𝒆)
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𝜿 = 0.805 
All agreement measures are at the “excellent” level (Landis and Koch 1977). These results 
are summarized in Table 3-5. Also, as suggested by the two judges, seven items were 
added, and three items were reworded. As a result, 96 items entered the second round of 
the Q-sort pilot study. 
Table 3-5- Summary of the First Round of Q Sort 
Inter Rater Raw Agreement Score 0.889 
Placement Ratio 0.906 
Cohen’s Kappa 0.805 
 
3. 5.  Second Round of Q-Sort 
In the second round, 96 items placed into the constructs entered the Q-sort study, and 
judges agreed on 95 items (Table 3-6). 
Table 3-6- Second Round of Q-Sort 
Round 2 
Judge 1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 NA 
J
u
d
g
e
 2
 
1 6                                           
2   5                                         
3     8                                       
4       6                                     
5         3                                   
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Round 2 
Judge 1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 NA 
6           3                                 
7             7                               
8               9                             
9                 9                           
10                   8                         
11                     5                       
12                   1   3                     
13                         3                   
14                           3                 
15                             1               
16                               3             
17                                 1           
18                                   1         
19                                     1       
20                                       1     
21                                         3   
NA                                           6 
NA                                             
Total No. of placement: 96 Number of Agreement: 95 
 
3. 5. 1. Calculation for the Second Round 
Inter Rater Raw Agreement Score = 
Total Number of Items Agreed upon by Both Judges
Total Number of Items
 
Inter Rater Raw Agreement Score = 0.938 
Placement Ratio = 
∑ Total Number of Items Agreed upon by Judge ini=1
n∗ Total Number of Items
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Placement Ratio = 0.943 
Cohen’s Kappa 
𝜿 =
𝑷𝒓 (𝒂) −  𝑷𝒓 (𝒆)
𝟏 − 𝑷𝒓 (𝒆)
 
𝜿 = 0.904 
All agreement measures improved and are at the “excellent” level (Landis and Koch, 
1977). These results are summarized in Table 3-7. 
 
Table 3-7- Summary of the Second Round of Q-Sort 
Inter Rater Raw Agreement Score 0.889 
Placement Ratio 0.906 
Cohen’s Kappa 0.805 
Also, in this round as suggested by the two judges, four more items were added, three items 
were removed, and two items were reworded. As a result, 97 items survived the second 
round of the Q-sort study (Table 3-8). 
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Table 3-8- Q Sort Summary 
No. Construct 
Initial # of 
Items 
Q- Sort Round 1 
Q-Sort 
Round 2 
Final # of 
Items 
1 
Vendor Cooperation 
Mechanisms for Physician 11 Add 2   11 
2 
Hospital Monitoring on PV 
Relationship 7 Add 1 Add 2 10 
3 
Hospital Cooperation 
Mechanisms for Physician  9 Reword 1 Add 1 10 
4 
Hospital Cooperation 
Mechanisms for Vendor  8  Add 1 Add 1 10 
5 Physician as Vendor’s Agent 8 Add 1 Remove 1 8 
6 Physician as Hospital's Agent 9 Reword 1   9 
7 Hospital Vendor Relationship 9 Add 1 Remove 2 8 
8 
Standardization of IMDs’ 
Purchasing Process 5 Reword 1   5 
9 Performance 6 Reword 1  6 
10 Hospital Ownership 1   Reword 1 1 
11 
Hospital Location (Rural 
(Urban) 1     1 
12 Hospital Teaching Status 1     1 
13 Hospital Size 1 Reword 1   1 
14 Complexity (Case Mix Index) 1     1 
15 Quality (Hospital Reputation) 1   Reword 1 1 
16 Physician Employment Status 1     1 
17 Hospital Market Share 1     1 
18 Vendor Competition 1     1 
19 Hospital Dependence on Vendor 1   1 
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No. Construct 
Initial # of 
Items 
Q- Sort Round 1 
Q-Sort 
Round 2 
Final # of 
Items 
20 
Vendor’s Direct-to-Consumer 
Marketing 3   3 
21 Social Desirability Scale 5   7 
  Total Number of Items 90     97 
 
Based on the 97 surviving measurement items (96 questions and 1 trap question) through 
the second round of Q-sort study, 97 survey questions were established. Most of these 
questions employed seven point Likert scales to measure respondents’ perceptions. Also, 
the respondents’ social desirability index (Manning et al. 2009) was adopted to test the 
common method bias. Using all of these questions, a comprehensive questionnaire was 
developed (Appendix D).  
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Chapter 4 
4. Data Collection and Analysis 
Using the instrument developed in chapter 3, this study conducted data collection through 
a large-scale survey. At this stage according to recommendations from clinical and 
academic experts, more demographic information has been included in the survey 
instrument to help identify hospitals for future researches. By using the collected data 
measures of reliability and validity were tested. The data gathered at this stage, were used 
to further validate the measurement instrument and test the proposed hypotheses. 
4. 1.  Data Collection 
In this study, the primary research method is large-scale survey. This method has been used 
to collect data from hospitals all across the nation in The United States. In the following 
sections data collection method and procedure, as well as sample characteristics, and the 
non-response bias test, will be explained. 
4. 1. 1. Survey Method 
In social sciences research, large-scale surveys are widely utilized to gather information 
about certain entities. This method has a great potential for providing researchers 
qualitative and quantitative data to examine the relationships among multiple variables. 
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Specifically, this method entails developing a standard survey questionnaire to collect data 
from respondents, and analyze the mentioned data (Miller and Salkind 2002). 
Large-scale survey has several advantages over other methods like case study or focus 
groups. First of all, this method enables researcher to gather a huge amount of data and 
reach out to a great number of respondents (Kerlinger and Lee 2000). Next advantage of 
this method is its great potential for generalizability, since data has been gathered from a 
large and diverse source. Moreover, reliability and validity of the collected data can be 
examined by utilizing various statistical methods (Jin 2008). Finally, conducting a a large 
scale survey is relatively straightforward and its cost efficiency is high (Alreck and Settle 
1985). 
One of the main challenges in conducting a large scale survey is response rate which is 
usually low. This rate is declining over time which makes the data collection more difficult, 
specifically if research is conducted at the organization level. This particularly is the case 
when respondents are clinicians and managers of hospitals. These respondents are 
significantly harder to reach compared to official in other industries (Baruch and Holtom 
2008).  
To overcome this challenge, scholars have a number of suggestions. For instance while 
designing the survey instrument “the questionnaire should have a simple, appealing 
appearance” (Erdos and Morgan 1970):128. Personalized engagement of researcher, is 
another technique that has been cited as a mechanism to increase the response rate (Erdos 
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and Morgan 1970; Blankenship et al. 1998). This study uses all of these techniques to 
increase the response rate. In particular, a group of assistants, under supervision of a 
physician, who was fully aware of the research agenda and data collection procedure, made 
phone calls with potential respondents to encourage them for participation in this study. 
Afterwards an email containing the information about the research and a link to the online 
survey form was sent to each respondent, this also reduces the threat that questionnaire 
might be answered by someone other than the targeted respondent (Erdos and Morgan 
1970). 
4. 1. 2. Data Collection Procedure 
This research has collected data from two major sources. First list is a contact list of over 
one thousand hospital operating room directors. Second list is a contact list of over one 
thousand chief financial officers of hospitals. These two contact lists were acquired from 
LexisNexis Academic Database, which is a leading global provider of online information 
in different industries. LexisNexis is part of RELX Group and serves customers in more 
than 100 countries with more than 15,000 employees worldwide. This database is a reliable 
academic source that has been used by scholars in different disciplines including healthcare 
management (Wayne 2012). 
Contact lists were purified from any duplicates and unusable data, and then the initial phone 
calls to invite respondents have been made. Following to this step, data collection started. 
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In this step emails have been sent to respondents who showed interest in answering the 
questionnaire. This phase started in mid-December of 2014. Three weeks after the initial 
wave, reminder phone calls have been made to respondents who did not provide any 
response. Afterwards, the second wave of emails has been sent to them. This phase started 
in mid-January 2015. In total survey was sent to 1019 hospital officials. Final number of 
usable responses was 393, which yields the response rate of 38.57%. 177 of these responses 
were received from operating room directors, and 216 of them were received from chief 
financial officers. Summary of response rates is shown in the Table 4-1. 
Table 4-1- Response Rate Summary 
Respondents 
Chief Financial 
Officer 
Operation Room 
Director Total 
No. of Surveys Sent 633 386 1019 
No. of usable responses 216 177 393 
Response Rate 34.12% 45.85% 38.57% 
 
According to recommendations of academic and practitioner experts in the healthcare field, 
this study identified hospitals at the large-scale survey stage. This would help the author in 
future studies to match this primary data with secondary data about the identified hospitals. 
The author submitted the new survey instrument that identifies hospitals, to the University 
of Toledo IRB board. The University of Toledo IRB board approved the new instrument 
under the protocol number 200176.  
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4. 1. 3. Results of the Study 
In this section, as the first step, characteristics of the individual respondents are 
summarized. Following this step, non-response bias test, exploratory factor analysis, 
reliability test, convergent validity test, and discriminant validity test have been conducted. 
For the sake of brevity in the statistical analysis, this study abbreviates constructs. 
Abbreviations are shown in Table 4-2. 
Table 4-2- Constructs Abbreviation 
Construct Abbreviation 
Vendor Cooperation Mechanisms for Physician  VCMP 
Hospital Monitoring on P-V Relationship HMPV 
Hospital  Cooperation Mechanisms for Physician HCMP 
Hospital  Cooperation Mechanisms for Vendor HCMV 
Physician as Vendor’s Agent PVA 
Physician as Hospital’s Agent PHA 
Hospital Vendor Relationship HVR 
Standardization of IMD Purchasing Processes STD 
Performance  PERF 
 
4. 1. 4. Characteristics of the Large-Scale Respondent Sample 
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Multiple demographic variables have been gathered from the respondent sample. To be 
specific, information about individual respondents’ position in hospital, whether they are 
answering the survey with regards to their cardiac or orthopedic operating rooms, and 
finally information like type, location, and reputation of the hospitals have been gathered. 
Size of hospitals has been identified by gathering secondary data about the number of beds 
from sources like US News, CMS, and AHA. 
4. 1. 4. 1.   Characteristics of individual respondents 
Scholars in the Operations Management and Supply Chain Management field have 
emphasized on the importance of using multiple methodologies to achieve a high quality 
research. They argue that combining different approaches are essential to build a holistic 
view of the phenomena in OM and SCM filed (Boyer and Swink 2008). Recent works 
show great promise in paring primary survey data and secondary archival data 
(Dobrzykowski and Tarafdar 2015). Therefore in the survey instrument, hospitals have 
been identified. As a result, the collected data could be used in future research by pairing 
to secondary data.  
In the sample acquired from the large scale survey (n=393), 54.96% of usable responses 
received from Chief Financial Officers of the hospital and 45.04% of usable responses were 
received from Operating Room Directors. Among respondents 226 (57.51%) of responses 
are about cardiac operating rooms and procedures, and 167 (42.49%) of responses are about 
orthopedic operating rooms and procedures. Questionnaires have been sent to all 50 states 
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in The United States. Hospitals from 48 states participated in this survey. No responses 
were received from hospitals in Alaska and Delaware. As stated earlier, name, state, and 
zip code of respondent’s affiliated hospitals are recorded. Summary of the sample 
characteristics is shown in  
Table 4-3. 
Table 4-3- Sample Characteristics (n=393) 
Characteristics Respondents 
Hospital Ownership  
 For Profit 82 (20.87%) 
 Not For Profit 242 (61.58%) 
 public 69 (17.56%) 
Teaching Status  
 Teaching 153 (38.93%) 
 Non-Teaching 240 (61.07%) 
Size   
 Small (<50 ) 92 (23.41%) 
 Small to Medium (50-99) 50 (12.72%) 
 Medium (100-199) 77 (19.59%) 
 Medium to Large (200-400) 93 (23.66%) 
 Large (>400) 81 (20.61%) 
Location  
 Rural 99 (25.19%) 
  Urban 294 (74.81%) 
*Hospitals from 48 states participated in this survey 
 
 
4. 1. 5. Non-Response Bias Tests 
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Checking the non-respondent bias (Malhotra and Grover 1998) is an important procedure 
that ensures the generalizability of the outcomes of this study. Specifically, non-response 
bias shows the difference between the respondents who chose to participate versus those 
who did not (Armstrong and Overton 1977). In this study, non–response bias test is 
conducted by utilizing a chi-square test (Meyer and Collier 2001). In particular chi-square 
test shows the differences between characteristics of respondents and non-respondents. 
This study kept a record of hospital executives who declined to answer. Therefore a list of 
respondents and non-respondents is available. This study then matched these lists with 
information from American Hospital Association to retrieve characteristics of respondents 
and non-respondents. Chi-Square and T-test has been conducted to evaluate the non-
response bias. The results of these tests are shown in Table 4-4. 
Table 4-4- Non-Response Bias Test 
Variable Pearson χ2 DF P-value 
Teaching Status 0.457 2 0.796 
Ownership (For Profit, Not For Profit, Public) 1.83 4 0.772 
Location (Urban, Rural) 5.497 1 0.064 
Variable T-Value DF P-value 
Size (Number of Beds) 1.012 694 0.31 
 
According to the results of Chi-Square and T-test for Non-response Bias, the difference 
between respondents and non-respondents is not significant for size (number of beds), 
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ownership (For Profit, Not For Profit, Public), location (Urban, Rural), and teaching status 
(Teaching, Non-Teaching) of the hospitals.  
4. 2.  Instrument Validation Methodology 
This section of study, introduces the instrument validation methods such as structural 
equation modeling (SEM), the measurement approach, the assessment indices, and the 
process of assessing measurement model. 
4. 2. 1. Structural Equation Modeling 
Structural Equations Modeling (SEM) is the major statistical method in this research. This 
method is used to validate instruments and test the hypotheses (Cool et al. 1989; Simonin 
1999; Fornell 1992; Fornell et al. 1996; Bontis 1998; Bontis et al. 2000). This method is 
intensively used in social science were the relationship between variables is much complex 
(Byrne 2013a). In essence SEM is a combination of confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
and multiple regression method (Hair et al. 2006). 
This study, before reporting on the SEM results, briefly introduces the lexicon of this 
method. In general SEM constitutes of components such as measurement variable (item), 
i.e. observed variable. Squares or boxes represent these items. Another element of SEM is 
construct, i.e. unobservable or latent variable. Ovals or circles show this element. 
Constructs are associated with multiple measurement variables (items), and errors. Errors 
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are shown with smaller ovals or circles. Finally SEM contains single direction arrows that 
represent the causal (association) relationships between variables (Byrne 2013b). 
From another standpoint, structural equation modeling is constituted of measurement 
model and a structural model (Byrne 2013b). On one hand, Measurement models utilize a 
number of items to reflect construct, evaluate the contribution of those items to the 
construct, evaluate the construct reliabilities, and finally assess the measurement errors 
(Marsillac 2010). On the other hand, structural model, illustrates the hypothesized 
associations between constructs. These associations are evaluated between a set of 
independent (exogenous) variables, and a set of dependent (endogenous) variables (Byrne 
2013b). 
4. 2. 2. Reflective Measurement Approach 
 In this research, all constructs are of first order which are measured by their respective 
measurement items. Constructs in this study are built using the reflective model approach 
(Jarvis et al. 2003; Tabachnick and Fidell 2007). In the reflective model, the direction of 
causality (association) is from construct to item (Jarvis et al. 2003). This  means that any 
change in the construct conceptualization, will impact the measurement items, however 
dropping measurement items does not impact the conceptual definition of the construct 
(Petter et al. 2007). Therefore measurement items are supposed to be correlated, and for 
the same reason measurement errors are taken into account at the items level (Jarvis et al. 
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2003). Through a comprehensive literature review and logical evaluation, this study 
conceptualizes all constructs through the reflective approach.  
4. 3.  Analysis Method 
Structural equations modeling techniques can be categorized in two main streams (Hsu et 
al. 2006). First stream is covariance methods. Software like AMOS, LISREL, and EQS, 
mainly use this method. Second stream is component based structural equations modeling, 
e.g. partial least squares. Software like Smart PLS uses this method (Gefen et al. 2000).  
4. 3. 1. Covariance Based SEM Methodologies 
Covariance methods compare the observed and predicted variance-covariance matrix, and 
then estimate the loadings and path coefficients of the model. For developing the observed 
variance-covariance matrix, these methods calculate the co-variance structure of manifest 
variables (items). Among others, most common method to calculate parameters is the 
maximum likelihood estimate. This method necessitates the observed data distribution to 
be multivariate normal (Byrne 2013b; Jöreskog and Sörbom 1996). 
 
4. 3. 2. Component Based SEM Methodologies 
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These methods use multiple regression method to calculate parameters. They are also 
called Partial Least Square (PLS) methods. Compared to covariance-based methods, PLS 
methods are used in analyzing explorative research, complex models, small sample size, 
and formative constructs (Fornell and Larcker 1981; Fornell and Bookstein 1982; Venaik 
et al. 2005; Hsu et al. 2006; Henseler et al. 2009). 
However, in this study all constructs are reflective, and purpose of the model is testing a 
set of theoretical relationships developed based on an intensive literature review and 
structured interviews. In such scenarios, scholars (Hsu et al. 2006) suggest that covariance 
based SEM methods should be used. Therefore, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, this 
study employs EQS Structural Equation Modeling Software, version 6.1, due to its 
advantages in testing complex theoretical models (Byrne 2013b).  
4. 3. 3. Assessment Indices 
Many statistical indices are used to evaluate the power of measurement models. Although 
there is no consensus among scholars on how to use the mentioned indices, researchers 
usually use a number of indices to gain an inclusive assessment of the measurement model 
(Kline 2014). Drawing on the instruction of statistics scientists (Hair et al. 2006), this study 
adopts three categories of indices: overall fit measures, comparative fit measures, and 
parsimonious fit measures. These indices and their acceptable values are summarized in 
Table 4-5. 
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Table 4-5- Indices of Fitness of Model 
Indices   
Value 
Range 
Recommended 
Values 
References 
Overall Fit Measures 
  
   
Chi-square χ² 
Wide 
range 
The lower the 
better 
(Jöreskog and Sörbom 
1996) (Byrne 2013a; Hu 
and Bentler 1998). 
Goodness of Fit GFI  0-1 
>0.8 is acceptable; 
>0.9 is good. 
(Jöreskog and Sörbom 
1996; Hair et al. 2006; 
Hu and Bentler 1998) 
Root Mean 
Square Residual 
RMR  0-∞ 
<0.08 is 
acceptable; <0.05 
is good  
(Byrne 2013b; Hu and 
Bentler 1998; 
Baumgartner and 
Homburg 1996) 
Comparative Fit Measures 
  
      
Normed Fit Index NFI 0-1  
>0.8 is acceptable; 
>0.9 is good. 
(Jöreskog and Sörbom 
1996; Hair et al. 2006; 
Hu and Bentler 1998) 
Comparative Fit 
Index 
CFI 0-1  
>0.8 is acceptable; 
>0.9 is good. 
(Jöreskog and Sörbom 
1996; Hair et al. 2006; 
Hu and Bentler 1998) 
Root Mean 
Square Error of 
Approximation 
RMSEA 0-∞ 
 <=0.08 is good; 
>0.10 indicates 
poor fit. 
(Jöreskog and Sörbom 
1996; Hair et al. 2006; 
Hu and Bentler 1998; 
Baumgartner and 
Homburg 1996) 
Parsimonious Fit Measures 
  
      
Adjusted 
Goodness of Fit 
AGFI 0-1  
>0.8 is acceptable; 
>0.9 is good. 
(Jöreskog and Sörbom 
1996; Hair et al. 2006; 
Hu and Bentler 1998) 
 
These measures of fit compare estimated covariance of proposed measurement model with 
the observed covariance (Hair et al., 2006). One caveat about using Chi-square as a model 
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fit index is its high sensitivity to sample size. On one hand Chi-Square is very sensitive to 
large sample sizes, and on the other hand most analysis of covariance structure deal with 
large sample sizes. Therefore finding an acceptable and well-fit Chi-square in SEM 
analysis has been proven to be unrealistic. Therefore over the past few decades new indices 
of fit have been developed to measure the goodness of fit for SEM models (Byrne 2013a; 
Hu and Bentler 1998). 
GFI reflects the variance and covariance jointly explained by the measurement model. The 
value of GFI ranges from 0 to 1. Values greater than 0.8 are acceptable, and values greater 
than 0.9 are good (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1996; Hair et al. 2006; Hu and Bentler 1998). 
RMR investigate the difference between covariance of the observed sample and model. 
There is no upper limit for RMR. Values smaller than 0.08 are acceptable, values smaller 
than 0.05 are good (Byrne 2013a; Hu and Bentler 1998). Comparative Fit Measures 
compare proposed measurement models with alternative measurement models (Hair et al. 
2006). In the alternative models, assumption is that all latent variables are uncorrelated. 
For instance, NFI reflects the percentage of improvement of the fit of proposed models 
over alternative models. The value of NFI ranges from 0 to 1. Values greater than 0.8 are 
acceptable, and values greater than 0.9 are good (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1996; Hair et al. 
2006; Hu and Bentler 1998). 
CFI shows the percentage of observed covariance that can be reproduced in the model. The 
value of CFI ranges from 0 to 1. Values greater than 0.8 are acceptable, and values greater 
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than 0.9 are good (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1996; Hair et al. 2006; Hu and Bentler 1998). 
RMSEA works against the sensitivity of the chi-square fit and provide an evaluation of 
model adequacy (Bollen and Long 1993). There is no upper limit for RMSEA; values less 
than 0.08 indicate good model fit; and values greater than 0.1 indicate poor model fit 
(Jöreskog and Sörbom 1996; Hair et al. 2006; Hu and Bentler 1998). 
4. 4.  Methodology of Measurement Model Assessment 
This study evaluates content validity convergent validity, discriminant validity, and 
reliability, to validate the measurement instrument (Bogozzi 1980; Bagozzi and Phillips 
1982). 
Content validity evaluates the adequacy of measurement items that represents the content 
of constructs (Nunnally et al. 1967). According to scholars (Haynes et al. 1995), content 
validity is the precondition of other statistical analysis by ensuring the accuracy of the 
measurement instrument. In practice, content validity is examined by comprehensive 
literature review (Nunnally et al. 1967), consultation with experts, and Q-sort (Moore and 
Benbasat 1991). This study conducted all these processes to evaluate the content validity. 
Details of these procedures are provided in Chapters 2 and 3. 
Convergent validity examines the extent to which the measurement items converge onto 
the specified construct (Campbell 1960). That is to say, convergent validity shows the 
goodness of fit between measurement items and the construct (Hair et al. 2006). 
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Convergent validity is usually examined using three methods. First, the significance of 
each measurement item’s estimated loadings on its respective construct are checked 
(Anderson and Gerbing 1988). Second, a set of statistical indices, including: χ², GFI, RMR, 
NFI, CFI, RMSEA, and AGFI (Hair et al. 2006; Dobrzykowski 2010) are examined. Third, 
the average variance extracted (AVE) values was calculated (Fornell and Larcker 1981; 
Hair et al. 2006). According to scholars (Hair et al. 2006) AVE value greater than 0.5 
provides an adequate evidence of convergent validity. 
Discriminant validity evaluates the independence of constructs that are measured by 
distinct groups of measurement items (Bagozzi and Phillips 1982).  The method used to 
assess discriminant validity is comparing the AVE values to the square of the correlations. 
Given that AVE value of each construct is greater than the square of the relevant correlation 
values, the discriminant validity exists (Fornell and Larcker 1981; Braunscheidel and 
Suresh 2009). An alternative method is comparing the square root of a construct’s AVE 
with the correlations between constructs is equivalent (Fornell and Larcker 1981). 
Reliability examines the internal consistency of constructs (Hair et al. 2006). Particularly, 
reliability reflects the extent to which a construct can generate the same outcomes in 
repeated statistical tests. Cronbach’s Alpha (Cronbach 1951) evaluates reliability, and the 
values greater than 0.7 are acceptable (Nunnally et al. 1967). 
4. 5.  Measurement Model Analysis and Results 
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This section analyzes the measurement model. The convergent validity, reliability, and 
discriminant validity examinations were reported respectively. Also, the overall model was 
investigated for the convergent validity and discriminant validity. It should be mentioned 
that the number of observed cases in the large scale survey is n=393. 
4. 5. 1.  Exploratory Factor Analysis 
In order to further validate the instrument, this study performs exploratory factor analysis 
(Hair et al. 2006). In this step, factor selection is performed for each construct. Extraction 
is based on Eigenvalues greater than one. Eigenvalues are a special set of values connected 
with a linear system of equations. These values sometimes are called characteristic roots, 
characteristic values, proper values, or latent roots (Hair et al. 2006). In order to obtain 
simple and interpretable factors, Varimax rotation method with Kaiser Normalization is 
used in the factor analysis. Rotation is a method used to further analyze the initial 
exploratory factor analysis to make the pattern of loading clearer (Hair et al. 2006). In this 
phase items that have factor loadings less than the acceptable threshold of 0.5 (Hair et al. 
2006) have been dropped. Exploratory factor analysis for this study is performed with the 
SPSS software. Results of the exploratory factor analysis on the large scale survey data are 
shown in Table 4-6.  
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Table 4-6- Results of Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Constructs 
  Items VCMP HMPV HCMP HCMV PVA PHA HVR STD PERF 
VCMP Q1 0.679 -0.129 -0.006 -0.024 -0.002 0.035 -0.208 0.098 -0.015 
  Q2 0.664 -0.117 0.146 0.144 -0.024 -0.256 0.249 0.097 0.076 
  Q3 0.615 0.080 0.108 -0.328 -0.109 0.132 0.055 0.053 -0.079 
  Q4 0.605 -0.098 -0.052 -0.244 -0.061 0.139 0.116 0.014 -0.018 
  Q5 0.622 0.239 -0.026 -0.081 0.087 0.082 0.239 0.205 0.057 
  Q6 0.546 -0.143 -0.161 -0.012 0.127 0.024 -0.142 -0.068 -0.052 
  Q7 0.539 0.116 -0.015 0.039 -0.008 -0.022 0.015 -0.055 -0.042 
  Q8 0.537 0.004 0.040 0.055 -0.126 -0.215 -0.145 0.006 0.104 
  Q9 0.531 -0.096 0.106 -0.141 0.006 0.021 -0.040 -0.268 0.012 
  Q10 0.531 -0.127 -0.247 0.191 0.021 0.198 0.100 0.172 0.223 
  Q11 0.265 -0.078 -0.056 0.257 0.266 -0.028 -0.054 -0.011 0.067 
HMPV Q12 0.241 0.029 0.097 0.111 -0.221 -0.075 -0.048 -0.185 0.199 
  Q13 0.214 0.043 0.141 -0.108 0.075 -0.158 0.081 -0.052 -0.023 
  Q14 0.003 0.662 -0.020 -0.075 -0.065 0.020 -0.091 0.017 -0.094 
  Q15 -0.157 0.671 0.197 0.087 -0.006 -0.089 -0.051 0.052 0.016 
  Q16 0.078 0.595 -0.105 -0.055 -0.144 0.100 0.038 -0.156 0.263 
  Q17 0.217 0.589 -0.103 0.218 0.146 0.116 0.119 -0.040 -0.223 
  Q18 -0.147 0.616 0.055 0.237 -0.043 -0.260 0.074 -0.127 -0.088 
  Q19 -0.046 0.544 -0.139 0.127 -0.125 0.166 0.270 0.043 -0.014 
  Q20 0.032 0.549 -0.108 -0.139 0.225 -0.104 0.112 0.133 0.009 
  Q21 0.178 0.186 0.000 -0.063 0.092 -0.078 0.053 -0.171 0.107 
HCMP Q22 -0.061 0.087 0.743 -0.036 0.009 0.011 0.153 -0.072 -0.006 
  Q23 0.135 -0.150 0.623 -0.045 -0.058 0.074 0.233 0.010 -0.034 
  Q24 0.016 -0.141 0.594 0.059 0.021 0.122 -0.048 0.166 -0.110 
  Q25 0.087 0.014 0.588 -0.279 -0.180 0.075 -0.148 0.022 0.050 
  Q26 0.152 -0.164 0.576 0.102 -0.243 0.103 -0.053 0.151 0.141 
  Q27 0.033 0.044 0.551 0.023 0.036 -0.116 -0.066 0.013 0.187 
  Q28 -0.016 0.077 0.526 -0.128 -0.179 -0.090 -0.073 -0.008 -0.066 
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Constructs 
  Items VCMP HMPV HCMP HCMV PVA PHA HVR STD PERF 
  Q29 -0.107 -0.128 0.253 0.145 0.190 0.041 -0.031 -0.027 0.131 
  Q30 -0.031 0.077 0.240 0.028 0.057 -0.175 -0.063 0.186 0.278 
  Q31 0.021 0.038 0.248 0.088 0.045 -0.006 -0.052 -0.026 0.023 
HCMV Q32 0.007 -0.067 -0.040 0.694 0.021 -0.208 -0.014 -0.079 -0.024 
  Q33 0.036 0.077 0.021 0.622 -0.125 -0.016 0.036 0.022 0.289 
  Q34 0.305 0.105 0.140 0.578 -0.049 -0.077 -0.044 0.006 -0.154 
  Q35 -0.040 -0.034 -0.049 0.557 0.005 -0.033 -0.101 0.063 -0.126 
  Q37 -0.010 0.055 0.043 0.570 0.033 0.019 -0.015 -0.077 -0.213 
  Q38 0.077 0.197 0.126 0.548 -0.183 0.180 -0.001 0.158 -0.100 
  Q39 0.018 0.008 0.060 0.553 0.110 0.269 0.089 0.008 0.003 
  Q40 -0.097 -0.029 0.143 0.254 -0.028 0.239 0.045 -0.011 0.009 
PVA Q41 0.093 -0.157 -0.173 -0.002 0.624 -0.079 0.054 -0.102 0.064 
  Q42 -0.113 0.214 0.276 -0.199 0.612 0.006 -0.006 -0.159 -0.024 
  Q43 0.018 -0.040 0.026 0.021 0.680 -0.019 0.008 -0.046 -0.076 
  Q44 -0.028 0.123 0.028 0.045 0.732 0.215 -0.031 0.096 -0.018 
  Q45 -0.032 -0.181 0.052 0.175 0.540 0.102 -0.079 0.018 0.170 
  Q46 0.192 0.242 0.098 0.067 0.548 -0.240 -0.224 0.212 0.020 
  Q47 -0.060 0.185 0.108 0.187 0.032 0.206 -0.059 -0.130 0.118 
  Q48 0.037 -0.045 0.096 -0.001 -0.190 0.142 0.152 0.009 -0.074 
PHA Q49 -0.046 -0.160 0.144 -0.001 -0.059 0.644 0.143 -0.007 -0.035 
  Q50 0.164 0.090 -0.023 -0.145 -0.074 0.614 -0.073 -0.035 -0.142 
  Q51 -0.030 0.102 0.074 -0.100 0.042 0.602 -0.072 0.023 0.000 
  Q52 -0.110 -0.221 -0.087 0.076 0.113 0.536 0.092 0.040 -0.142 
  Q53 0.078 -0.118 0.181 0.070 -0.107 0.524 -0.172 0.179 -0.117 
  Q54 0.006 0.017 -0.110 0.002 0.067 0.538 0.047 -0.072 0.076 
  Q55 0.072 -0.048 -0.174 -0.017 -0.025 0.561 0.018 -0.048 0.166 
  Q56 0.142 0.248 0.053 0.023 0.098 0.160 -0.250 0.083 -0.008 
  Q57 -0.003 0.108 0.040 -0.070 0.014 -0.154 0.057 0.256 0.070 
HVR Q58 0.096 -0.076 -0.052 0.037 -0.158 -0.017 0.558 0.142 -0.122 
  Q59 0.071 -0.043 -0.046 -0.110 -0.104 -0.038 0.545 -0.270 -0.141 
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Constructs 
  Items VCMP HMPV HCMP HCMV PVA PHA HVR STD PERF 
  Q60 0.030 0.017 0.024 0.162 -0.150 0.057 0.686 -0.097 0.329 
  Q61 -0.189 0.000 -0.131 0.012 0.064 0.085 0.673 0.165 0.068 
  Q62 0.089 0.119 0.090 -0.151 0.238 -0.097 0.657 0.113 -0.132 
  Q63 -0.081 0.011 0.034 -0.176 0.085 0.055 0.548 -0.084 0.084 
  Q64 -0.137 0.075 -0.013 -0.048 -0.064 0.255 -0.112 -0.231 -0.014 
  Q65 -0.010 -0.088 -0.013 0.073 -0.198 -0.226 -0.132 0.355 0.042 
STD Q66 0.034 0.052 0.016 -0.106 -0.055 -0.104 -0.025 0.617 -0.037 
  Q67 0.047 -0.107 0.016 0.049 0.032 0.152 0.131 0.615 0.018 
  Q68 -0.082 0.277 -0.296 -0.036 -0.077 0.143 -0.119 0.596 0.097 
  Q69 0.006 -0.207 -0.020 -0.127 -0.095 -0.098 -0.176 0.564 0.035 
  Q70 -0.165 -0.046 0.162 -0.047 0.203 0.071 0.163 0.685 -0.102 
PERF Q71 0.012 0.175 -0.151 0.101 -0.305 0.062 0.049 0.389 0.074 
  Q72 -0.041 -0.135 -0.074 -0.030 -0.001 -0.016 -0.084 0.092 0.686 
  Q73 -0.018 0.054 -0.054 -0.105 -0.030 0.132 -0.290 -0.023 0.633 
  Q74 0.271 0.019 0.123 0.119 0.172 0.083 -0.242 -0.072 0.618 
  Q75 0.083 0.031 0.024 -0.099 0.014 0.016 0.139 -0.052 0.624 
  Q76 -0.269 0.069 -0.038 -0.160 0.015 -0.040 0.089 0.122 0.572 
  Q77 -0.177 -0.108 0.138 -0.041 0.004 -0.107 0.092 0.006 0.343 
 
4. 5. 2. Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
After dropping the items with low loadings, based on the exploratory factor analysis, this 
study conducts a confirmatory factor analysis to test the validity and reliability of 
constructs and in general the measurement model. In this phase factor loading coefficient 
or λ, average variance extracted or AVE, along with indices of model fit are calculated. 
4. 5. 2. 1.  Vendor Cooperation Mechanisms 
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Based on the results of exploratory factor analysis for first construct, i.e. Vendor 
Cooperation Mechanisms for Physician item Q11 was dropped. After this item purification 
in the measurement model, fit indices and the AVE values provide sufficient evidence of 
convergent validity for each factor of this construct. 
4. 5. 2. 2.  Hospital Monitoring on Physician-Vendor Relationship 
According to the results of exploratory factor analysis for the second construct, i.e. Hospital 
Monitoring on Physician-Vendor Relationship, seven items show proper loading. Items Q-
12, Q-13, and Q-21 were dropped due to poor loading. Afterwards, this construct entered 
into the measurement model in EQS software for confirmatory factor analysis to test for 
validity and reliability. The model fit indicators and the AVE values provide sufficient 
evidence of convergent validity for each factor of this construct. 
4. 5. 2. 3.  Hospital Cooperation Mechanisms for Physician 
As reported in the results of exploratory factor analysis for the third construct, i.e. Hospital 
cooperation mechanisms for physician, 8 items show proper loading. Items Q-29, Q-30, 
and Q-31 were deleted because of inappropriate loading. Then, this construct entered into 
the measurement model in EQS software for confirmatory factor analysis to test for validity 
and reliability. The model fit indicators and the AVE values provide sufficient evidence of 
convergent validity for each factor of this construct.  
4. 5. 2. 4.  Hospital Cooperation Mechanisms for Vendor 
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Based on the results of exploratory factor analysis for the fourth construct, i.e. Hospital 
Cooperation Mechanisms for vendor, 7 items show proper loading. Items Q-40 was deleted 
because of inappropriate loading. Then, this construct, as part of the overall measurement 
model, entered in the EQS software for confirmatory factor analysis to test for validity and 
reliability. This should be mentioned again that item Q-36 is a trap question to catch 
respondent’s fatigue and should not be answered. Therefore this item is also dropped from 
calculations. The model fit indicators and the AVE values provide sufficient evidence of 
convergent validity for each factor of this construct.  
4. 5. 2. 5.  Physician as Vendor’s Agent 
Exploratory factor analysis for the fifth construct, i.e. Physician as Vendor’s Agent 
illustrates proper loading for 6 items. Items Q-47 and Q-48 were dropped due to their weak 
loading. This construct then entered into the measurement model in EQS software for 
confirmatory factor analysis to test for validity and reliability. The model fit indicators and 
the AVE values provide sufficient evidence of convergent validity for each factor of this 
construct.   
4. 5. 2. 6.  Physician as Hospital’s Agent 
Exploratory factor analysis for the sixth construct, i.e. Physician as Hospital’s Agent 
demonstrates appropriate loading for seven items. Items Q-56 and Q-57 were dropped due 
to poor loading. After this purification, this latent construct then entered into the overall 
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measurement model in EQS software for confirmatory factor analysis to test for validity 
and reliability. The model fit indicators and the AVE values provide sufficient evidence of 
convergent validity for each factor of this construct.  
4. 5. 2. 7.  Hospital Vendor Relationship 
Exploratory factor analysis for the seventh construct, i.e. Hospital Vendor Relationship 
reveals proper loading for 6 items. Therefore, this study expect to find good fit indices in 
confirmatory factor analysis, after dropping items Q-64 and Q-65  due to their weak 
loadings. In order to perform confirmatory factor analysis, this latent construct entered into 
the measurement model in EQS software to test for validity and reliability. The model fit 
indicators and the AVE values provide sufficient evidence of convergent validity for each 
factor of this construct.  
4. 5. 2. 8.  Standardization of IMD Purchasing Processes 
In the exploratory factor analysis for the eighth construct, i.e. Standardization of IMD 
Purchasing Processes, results show adequate loading for all items. This needs to be 
confirmed by finding good fit indices in confirmatory factor analysis. In order to perform 
this analysis, this latent construct entered the measurement model in EQS software for 
confirmatory factor analysis to test for validity and reliability. The model fit indicators and 
the AVE values provide sufficient evidence of convergent validity for each factor of this 
construct.  
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4. 5. 2. 9.  Performance 
According to the results of the exploratory factor analysis for the ninth and the last 
construct, i.e. performance (Efficiency and Quality) six items show adequate loading for 
this construct. Q-71 is dropped due to improper loading. Since these results need to be 
confirmed by finding proper indices of fit in confirmatory factor analysis, this latent 
construct entered into the measurement model in EQS software for confirmatory factor 
analysis to test for validity and reliability. The model fit indicators and the AVE values 
provide sufficient evidence of convergent validity for each factor of this construct. 
4. 5. 3. Overall Measurement Model and CFA Analysis 
In this section, this study builds the correlated model that contains all constructs. The 
measurement model validation results for the overall model, including the results of the 
convergent validity and discriminant validity tests are shown. 
 
4. 5. 3. 1.  Convergent Validity and Fit Indices 
The estimated loadings of all items on the latent constructs are significant at the P<0.01 
level. The square roots of AVE values of all constructs are fairly close to, or above the 0.70 
threshold. This indicates a very good convergent validity of the overall model. Indices of 
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RMR (0.0412), RMSEA (0.046), GFI (0.822), AGFI (0.812), NFI (0.898), and CFI (0.989) 
provide strong support for model fit. Results of convergent validity are shown in Table 4-7. 
Table 4-7- Convergent Validity for Measurement Model 
 Construct Items λ*** AVE 
SQRT 
(AVE) 
Chronbach's 
Alpha Model Fit Indices 
VCMP Q1 0.75 0.47 0.69 0.79 RMR = 0.0412 
  Q2 0.62       GFI = 0.822 
  Q3 0.65       AGFI = 0.812 
  Q4 0.76       NFI = 0.898 
  Q5 0.55       CFI = 0.989 
  Q6 0.75       RMSEA = 0.046 
  Q7 0.75         
  Q8 0.48         
  Q9 0.75         
  Q10 0.75         
 HMPV Q14 0.79 0.54 0.74 0.88   
  Q15 0.61         
  Q16 0.77         
  Q17 0.60         
  Q18 0.80         
  Q19 0.78         
  Q20 0.77         
HCMP Q22 0.71 0.50 0.71 0.88   
  Q23 0.64         
  Q24 0.72         
  Q25 0.73         
  Q26 0.75         
  Q27 0.71         
  Q28 0.70         
HCMV Q32 0.66 0.43 0.66 0.85   
  Q33 0.65         
  Q34 0.67         
  Q35 0.65         
  Q37 0.73         
  Q38 0.58         
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 Construct Items λ*** AVE 
SQRT 
(AVE) 
Chronbach's 
Alpha Model Fit Indices 
  Q39 0.66         
PVA Q41 0.69 0.58 0.76 0.87   
  Q42 0.81         
  Q43 0.62         
  Q44 0.86         
  Q45 0.69         
  Q46 0.87         
PHA Q49 0.75 0.52 0.72 0.86   
  Q50 0.67         
  Q51 0.66         
  Q52 0.67         
  Q53 0.68         
  Q54 0.86         
  Q55 0.68         
HVR Q58 0.62 
               
0.42  
                  
0.65  
                                
0.88    
  Q59 0.54         
  Q60 0.61         
  Q61 0.64         
  Q62 0.62         
  Q63 0.82         
STD Q66 0.69 0.40 0.63 0.86   
  Q67 0.69         
  Q68 0.70         
  Q69 0.70         
  Q70 0.69         
 PERF Q72 0.77 0.59 0.76 0.88   
  Q73 0.79         
  Q74 0.77         
  Q75 0.77         
  Q76 0.76         
  Q77 0.71         
*** Significant at 0.01 Level 
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4. 5. 3. 2.  Discriminant Validity 
In order to test for discriminant validity, statisticians propose the method of comparing the 
square root of AVE for each construct to the correlation coefficients between that construct 
and all other constructs. If the square root of AVE is greater than the correlation 
coefficients, this shows proof for discriminant validity (Chin 1998). This study compares 
the square root of AVE values with correlation values for each construct to test for 
discriminate validity. The correlation matrix is developed using the EQS software. The 
output of the EQS software for the correlation matrix is shown in Figure 4-1. 
Figure 4-1- EQS Output for Correlation Matrix 
 
All of the AVE root values are higher than the relevant correlation values. Therefore, the 
discriminant validity of the overall measurement model is considered to be established. For 
details please see Table 4-8. 
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Table 4-8- Correlation Matrix with AVE Root Values for the Measurement Model 
 VCMP HMPV HCMP HCMV PVA PHA HVR STD PERF 
VCMP 0.69         
HMPV -0.69 0.74        
HCMP 0.61 -0.70 0.71       
HCMV -0.47 0.64 -0.44 0.66      
PVA 0.66 -0.74 -0.62 0.53 0.76     
PHA -0.64 0.71 0.60 -0.50 -0.64 0.72    
HVR -0.51 0.65 -0.54 0.37 0.50 0.45 0.65   
STD -0.51 0.58 0.53 0.50 -0.60 0.56 0.45 0.63  
PERF -0.65 0.69 0.62 0.61 -0.64 0.61 0.58 0.60 0.76 
All correlation coefficients are significant at P<0.01 
Note: For convenience, Square Roots of AVE Values are shown in bold font on the diagonal cells. 
4. 5. 4. Summary of Instrument Validity  
In summary, all nine constructs of this study show proper convergent and discriminant 
validity. Reliability indicators of all these constructs are acceptable. To be precise, tests of 
convergent validity, discriminant validity, and reliability all yield satisfactory results. In 
the next chapter analysis of the structural model and the proposed hypothesis are discussed. 
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Chapter 5 
5. Structural Model Analysis and Results 
In this chapter, this study reports on the process of analysis on the structural model and the 
proposed hypotheses. In other words, the main goal of this chapter is to test the model that 
has been proposed in chapter 2. As mentioned earlier, structural equations modeling is the 
method chosen for data analysis and testing the model. This study uses EQS Structural 
Equation Modeling Software, version 6.1, because of its advantages in testing complex 
theoretical models (Byrne 2013b).  
 
5. 1.  Proposed Structural Model 
In this section the structural model that has been proposed in chapter 2, is shown in 
Figure 5-1. This model entails nine main constructs, and proposes ten hypotheses.  
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Figure 5-1- Structural Model 
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5. 2.  Results of Structural Model Analysis 
In this section, this study repots the covariance modeling procedure, the results of the 
measurement model testing, and the results of the structural model testing. Consequently, 
this research reports post hoc analysis for common method bias. 
5. 2. 1. Review of Modeling Procedure 
This study utilizes the measurement model that includes nine reflective constructs. As 
stated in the previous chapter, factor analytic models deal with how the observed variables 
are related to their underlying latent variables. They basically are concerned with the 
regression path from factor to the observed variable. Since these models are focused on the 
relationship between latent factors and their observed items, they are called measurement 
model. This study has covered the measurement model analysis and results in the previous 
chapter (Byrne 2013b).  
Combining a measurement model with a structural model gives the researcher a model 
called “full latent variable model”. This model can deal with the regression between the 
latent variables. Therefore such a model is the right device for testing the hypothesized 
relationships among latent factors. In other words, a structural model along with a 
measurement model could represent the relationships between latent construct and their 
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observed factors, as well as the relationship between the latent variables. A complete latent 
variable model that represents causal associations in only one direction is also called a 
“recursive model” (Byrne 2013b). The model developed in this study is a recursive model. 
Results of the measurement model have been explained in details in the previous chapter. 
In the next section, results of the structural model will be explained.  
5. 2. 2. Results of the Structural Model 
In this section, this study reports the results of structural equation modeling analysis 
performed on the structural model using EQS software (Byrne 2013b). This report includes 
the values of path coefficients for each hypothesized relationship and their significance 
level, along with the model fit indices. The results are shown in Table 5-1. The results of 
structural model analysis in the EQS software are illustrated in Figure 5-2. In the EQS 
software F1 to F9 respectively represent VCMP, HMPV, HCMP, HCMV, PVA, PHA, 
HVR, STD, and PERF. The results of structural model analysis (path coefficients along 
with their significance level) are illustrated on the model in Figure 5-3. 
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Figure 5-2- Structural Model Results (EQS Software) 
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Figure 5-3- Results of the Structural Model Analysis 
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A summary of the above calculations, model fit indices, path coefficients, and significance levels is presented in Table 5-1. 
Table 5-1- Results of Structural Model Analysis 
Hypothesized 
Relationship 
Standardized Coefficient (β) t-Value Standard Error Sig. Support Model Fit Indices 
VCMP-PVA 0.264 2.132 0.325 <.05 Strong RMR = 0.010 
HMPV-PVA (Neg.) -0.586 -2.283 0.348 <.05 Strong GFI = 0.838 
HMPV-PHA 0.492 2.070 0.157 <.05 Strong AGFI = 0.825 
HCMP-PHA 0.615 2.731 0.181 <.01 Strong NFI = 0.982 
HCMV-HVR 0.871 2.632 0.204 <.01 Strong CFI = 0.953 
PHA-PVA (Neg.) -0.476 -2.144 0.450 <.05 Strong RMSEA = 0.033 
PVA-STD (Neg.) -0.654 -3.534 0.370 <.01 Strong  
PHA-STD 0.356 4.322 0.035 <.01 Strong  
HVR-STD 0.227 4.071 0.022 <.01 Strong  
STD-PERF 0.861 3.873 0.271 <.01 Strong 
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5. 2. 3. Common Method Variance Assessment 
Notwithstanding the fact that there are several advantages in using a survey research 
method, when a study is solely based on single respondent survey, common method 
variance (CMV) is a concern. Although, in order to tackle this problem, this study sought 
response from two sources in each hospital (chief financial officer, and operation room 
director), dual responses from the same hospital were negligible. Therefore this study, like 
any other study that uses primary data, is prone to CMV bias. In essence, common method 
variance bias is the tendency of respondent to revise their answers to make them more 
socially acceptable. In other words respondents answer the questions based on what they 
think the researchers wants them to answer (Podsakoff et al. 2003). 
5. 2. 3. 1.  Harmon’s Single Factor Approach 
This study uses Harmon’s single factor approach to evaluate the level of CMV (Podsakoff 
et al. 2003). In this method only one factor is extracted from all the survey items via 
exploratory or confirmatory factor analysis. If the total explained variance is less than 25%, 
one can argue that CMV is not an issue in this research (Podsakoff et al. 2003). In order to 
perform Harmon’s single factor test, one factor has been created and all items were forced 
to load on this factor. According to the results (Table 5-2) this general factor only accounts 
for 3.024% of the total variance which is well below the threshold of 0.25 (Podsakoff et al. 
2003). Therefore this study argues that common method bias is not an issue for this study. 
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Table 5-2- Results of Harmon Single Factor Test (SPSS Software) 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 2.299 3.024 3.024 2.299 3.024 3.024 
2 2.116 2.785 5.809 
   
3 2.058 2.708 8.517 
   
4 2.020 2.658 11.175 
   
5 1.962 2.582 13.757 
   
6 1.875 2.468 16.225 
   
7 1.804 2.374 18.599 
   
8 1.800 2.368 20.967 
   
9 1.766 2.323 23.291 
   
10 1.746 2.298 25.588 
   
11 1.668 2.195 27.783 
   
12 1.616 2.126 29.909 
   
13 1.589 2.091 32.001 
   
14 1.532 2.016 34.017 
   
15 1.502 1.976 35.993 
   
16 1.461 1.922 37.916 
   
17 1.439 1.894 39.810 
   
18 1.418 1.865 41.675 
   
19 1.389 1.827 43.502 
   
20 1.355 1.783 45.285 
   
21 1.345 1.770 47.055 
   
22 1.296 1.705 48.760 
   
23 1.273 1.674 50.434 
   
24 1.256 1.653 52.087 
   
25 1.213 1.596 53.683 
   
26 1.199 1.578 55.261 
   
27 1.188 1.563 56.825 
   
28 1.136 1.494 58.319 
   
29 1.126 1.481 59.800 
   
30 1.095 1.441 61.241 
   
31 1.075 1.415 62.656 
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Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
32 1.054 1.387 64.043 
   
33 1.014 1.334 65.377 
   
34 .988 1.300 66.678 
   
35 .980 1.289 67.967 
   
37 .952 1.253 69.220 
   
38 .926 1.219 70.439 
   
39 .918 1.209 71.647 
   
40 .894 1.176 72.824 
   
41 .887 1.167 73.991 
   
42 .854 1.124 75.114 
   
43 .820 1.079 76.193 
   
44 .795 1.046 77.239 
   
45 .793 1.044 78.283 
   
46 .769 1.012 79.296 
   
47 .740 .973 80.269 
   
48 .719 .946 81.214 
   
49 .714 .939 82.154 
   
50 .699 .919 83.073 
   
51 .684 .900 83.973 
   
52 .657 .864 84.837 
   
53 .637 .839 85.675 
   
54 .622 .818 86.494 
   
55 .602 .792 87.286 
   
56 .592 .779 88.064 
   
57 .583 .767 88.831 
   
58 .568 .748 89.579 
   
59 .558 .734 90.313 
   
60 .538 .707 91.021 
   
61 .534 .703 91.723 
   
62 .508 .668 92.392 
   
63 .506 .666 93.058 
   
64 .470 .618 93.676 
   
65 .447 .589 94.265 
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Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
66 .434 .571 94.836 
   
67 .425 .559 95.394 
   
68 .420 .553 95.947 
   
69 .400 .527 96.474 
   
70 .379 .498 96.972 
   
71 .375 .494 97.466 
   
72 .363 .478 97.943 
   
73 .350 .461 98.404 
   
74 .327 .431 98.835 
   
75 .323 .425 99.259 
   
76 .289 .380 99.640 
   
77 .274 .360 100.000 
   
 
5. 2. 3. 2.  Social Desirability Scale Approach 
This study also follows the guidelines provided by scholars (Podsakoff et al. 2003) to 
minimize the CMV bias. For instance, survey instrument clearly states that participation is 
voluntary and respondents could remain completely anonymous. Moreover, questions that 
address different parts of model are separated in different categories. Finally, and more 
importantly, this study controls for social desirability (Manning et al. 2009), in order to 
mitigate the effect of CMV bias on the results of this study. Social desirability scale is 
adapted from validated instruments (Manning et al. 2009) and has been translated into the 
context of this study. According to researchers (Crowne and Marlowe 1960) social 
desirability originally has been defined as a situation in which respondents answer 
questions based on social standards, or in a way to appeal researcher, rather than expressing 
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their true perception. This seminal work (Crowne and Marlowe 1960) has been extended 
and led to development of the current scale of social desirable responding (Manning et al. 
2009) that has been adapted in this study. This scale is shown in Table 5-3.  
 
Table 5-3- Social Desirability Scale 
Social Desirability Scale Reference(s) 
On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I 
thought too little of my ability.  
(Crowne and Marlowe 
1960; Manning et al. 
2009)  
There have been few times when I felt like rebelling against people in 
authority even though I knew they were right. 
 
No matter whom I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener.  
I don’t find it particularly difficult to get along with loud mouthed, 
obnoxious people. 
 
I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone’s feelings.  
I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.  
When I don’t know something I don’t at all mind admitting it.  
I have never been irritated when people expressed ideas very different 
from my own. 
 
 
After building this construct, statistical analysis of the model has been employed to 
compare results. The results show that all path loadings of indicators and their respective 
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constructs remain significant. All hypotheses also remain significant with the same 
directions that the analysis for original model shows. These results show that the analysis 
of the proposed relationships yield the same results when controlled for the common 
method variance bias (CMV).  
5. 2. 4. Control for Different Respondents 
This study also controls the results for the responses that have received from different 
groups of respondents. In order to perform this test, this study controls if the results will 
show any difference when responses from cardiac versus orthopedic group are used. 
Likewise, this study controls if there is any difference in the results when responses of the 
operating room directors are used versus when the responses from chief financial officers. 
The results of the control tests show that all path loadings remain significant, and all 
hypotheses are supported with the same directions. In other words, these tests show that 
the analysis of the proposed relationships yield the same results when controlled for the 
different groups of respondents.  
5. 2. 5. Control for Hospital Ownership 
Since ownership of the hospital is a very important construct and usually has significant 
effects on the proposed relationship in research (Said et al. 2003), this study controls for 
hospital ownership. Hospital ownership is categorized in three different types, i.e. for 
profit, not for profit, and public. The results of the structural equation modeling test on the 
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control models and the original model show that all path loadings remain significant, and 
all hypotheses are supported with the same directions as in the original model. Table 5-4, 
summarizes the results of this test. 
Table 5-4- Results Controlled for Hospital Ownership 
  Control Model Original Model 
Hypothesized 
Relationship 
Std. (β) t-Value Sig. Supp. Std. (β) t-Value Sig. Support Sig. Supp. 
VCMP-PVA 0.25 2.14 <.05 Strong 0.26 2.13 <.05 Strong <.05 Strong 
HMPV-PVA -0.5 -1.98 <.05 Strong -0.6 -2.3 <.05 Strong <.05 Strong 
HMPV-PHA 0.5 2.25 <.05 Strong 0.49 2.07 <.05 Strong <.05 Strong 
HCMP-PHA 0.63 2.91 <.01 Strong 0.62 2.73 <.01 Strong <.01 Strong 
HCMV-HVR 0.79 2.48 <.01 Strong 0.87 2.63 <.01 Strong <.01 Strong 
PHA-PVA -0.4 -3.26 <.01 Strong -0.5 -2.1 <.05 Strong <.05 Strong 
PVA-STD -0.6 -3.00 <.01 Strong -0.7 -3.5 <.01 Strong <.01 Strong 
PHA-STD 0.3 4.30 <.01 Strong 0.36 4.32 <.01 Strong <.01 Strong 
HVR-STD 0.26 3.04 <.01 Strong 0.23 4.07 <.01 Strong <.01 Strong 
STD-PERF 0.78 3.49 <.01 Strong 0.86 3.87 <.01 Strong <.01 Strong 
5. 3.  Discussion of Hypotheses 
According to the statistical analysis, all ten proposed hypotheses are strongly supported. In 
the following sections, this study presents a discussion about these results based on 
theoretical and logical grounds. 
 
H1. Vendor cooperation mechanisms are positively associated with agency 
role of physician for vendor. 
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This hypothesis is strongly supported by the results of statistical analysis (β=0.264, t-
value=2.132, p<.05). This shows that the vendor cooperation mechanisms for physician 
increase the agency role of physician for vendor. In other words, these cooperation 
mechanisms have desirable outcomes for vendor as they make the bond between the 
physician and vendor stronger. This is in accordance with the concept of filling the 
structural hole in service setting (Li and Choi 2009) where the customer and service 
provider are in close contact, and this leads to the bridge decay. In other words buyer will 
no longer benefit from the absence of relationship between its supplier and its customer 
(bridge). In the case of this study, as the bond (agency role) between the vendor and 
physician becomes stronger, hospital will be in a worse position (bridge decay)  (Li and 
Choi 2009). These phenomena have been explained in detail in chapter 2.  
 
H2a. Hospital monitoring on physician and vendor relationship is 
negatively associated with the agency role of physician for vendor. 
This hypothesis is strongly supported, and the relationship is statistically significant (β=-
0.586, t-value=-2.283, p<.05). The statistical analysis shows a negative relationship 
between the hospital monitoring and the agency role of physician for vendor. This shows 
that hospital monitoring on the relationship between hospital and vendor, reduces the 
agency role of physician for vendor. This corroborates the previous proposition of this 
study for hospital administrators that in order to make physician a member of hospital team, 
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they need to screen the relationship between vendor and physicians. This is also in 
accordance with literature on the case of agency dilemma in which monitoring is proven 
to be one of the main remedies for the moral hazard problem (van der Valk and van 
Iwaarden 2011; Eisenhardt 1989). 
H2b. Hospital monitoring on physician and vendor relationship is positively 
associated with the agency role of physician for hospital. 
This hypothesis is strongly supported by the results of statistical analysis (β=0.492, t-
value=2.070, p<.05). This indicates that as monitoring the relationship between vendor and 
physician weakens the agency role of physician for vendor, simultaneously it strengthen 
the agency role of physician for hospital. This is in accordance with the common agency 
concept which has been discussed before. For hospital administrators, these results suggest 
that they need to keep an eye on the relationship between physician and vendor, as the 
longstanding and strong relationship between the vendor and physician (Burns et al. 2009; 
Burns and Muller 2008; Burns and Thorpe 1993; Schneller et al. 2006), could be managed 
by monitoring their relationship. In other words, this monitoring change the agency balance 
in favor of the hospital. 
 
H3a. Hospital Cooperation mechanisms are positively associated with 
higher agency role of physician for hospital. 
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This hypothesis is strongly supported by the results of statistical analysis (β=0.615, t-
value=2.731, p<.01). These statistical results show that cooperation mechanisms that this 
study identifies as predictors of a strong bond (agency role) between physician and hospital 
are truly associated with higher degrees of agency role of physicians for hospital. For 
hospital administration this has an important message. Hospitals need to play a dual role in 
maintaining the permanent bridge decay (Burt 2002; Li and Choi 2009). Not only do they 
have to monitor the relationship between vendor and physician, but also they should 
incentivize physicians and cooperate with them. These two in tandem will lead to higher 
degrees of a desirable relationship with physician, i.e. physician agency role for hospital. 
 
H3b. Hospital Cooperation mechanisms are positively associated with 
strong buyer-supplier relationship between hospital and vendor. 
This hypothesis is also strongly supported by the results of statistical analysis (β=0.871, t-
value=2.632, p<.01). These statistical results show that cooperation mechanisms that are 
identified in this study as antecedents of a cooperative relationship between hospital and 
vendor, in fact increase that relationship. For hospital management, this means that hospital 
should see vendor as part of its supply chain and treat vendor as a partner. Hospital 
procurement officers in this case need to wear the hat of a supply chain manager, and try 
to use techniques that enhance their relationship with suppliers. This is in agreement with 
recommendations of operations management scholars that propose techniques and 
132 
 
mechanisms for supplier development and emphasize on building a cooperative 
relationship with suppliers (Modi and Mabert 2007). 
 
H4. Agency role of physician for hospital is negatively associated with the 
agency role of physician for vendor. 
This hypothesis is strongly supported, and the path coefficient is statistically significant 
(β= -0.476, t-value=-2.144, p<.05). In other words, results of this study show that for a 
physician, higher levels of agency for hospital are associated with lower levels of agency 
for vendor. This is a very important result in the context of the triadic relationship between 
hospital, physician, and vendor. First, it highlights the centrality of physicians in 
purchasing decisions about IMDS (Egol et al. 2014). Traditionally profession of medicine 
has been characterized with autonomy, accountability, self-regulation, and not being 
subject of evaluation by others (Freidson 1988). This traditional view has been revised and 
scholars (Light and Aasland 2003) suggest that as the external bodies have access to 
information about physicians’ practice, the autonomy of physicians is superseded by their 
accountability. However, in many cases, physicians still have the final call. For instance, 
scholars point out that in the case of physician preference items, although hospitals try to 
become more exact in monitoring and influencing the process of procurement, physician 
still have a good influence on hospitals decisions (Schneller and Wilson 2009). These 
results also show that a dual agency issue (Adams 2014) exist in the service triad studied 
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by this research. Dual agency, also called dual loyalty or mixed agency, in medicine (Carr 
2004) arises when a physician acts as the agent of two principals. In this study these two 
principals are hospital and vendor. In short, this is a moral challenge that physicians face 
in situations that involve competing and conflicting interests. Specifically, when physician 
plays a higher role as the agent of hospital in purchasing of IMDs, he/she is more inclined 
toward defending the hospital stakes than those of vendor. Although physician has the 
opportunity to build a dual agency relationship with both vendor and hospital, with increase 
in one role, the other will decrease. 
 
H5a. Agency role of physician for vendor is negatively associated with IMD 
standardization. 
This hypothesis is strongly supported, and the path coefficient is statistically significant 
(β= -0.654, t-value= -3.534, p<.01). This study hypothesizes that the agency role of 
physicians for vendor is negatively associated with standardization of IMD purchasing 
procedures, and the statistical results confirm this negative and significant association. This 
study defines standardization as “The extent to which hospital has standard processes for 
managing, controlling, and coordinating the purchasing process of orthopedic and cardiac 
implantable medical devices.” 
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When physician plays a higher agency role for vendors, they have a close cooperative 
relationship with vendor and therefore they are more familiar with the state of the art 
technology of IMDs, the dynamics of the industry, and future trends in the market. 
Therefore there will be a great information asymmetry between physician and hospital. 
This puts physician in a superior position in making procurement decisions. Physician, as 
agent of vendor, holds the upper hand, and could hinder the efforts of hospital in 
implementing standardization strategies.  
It is well worth mentioning that the relationship between physician and vendor has not been 
thoroughly studied (Schneller and Wilson 2009). Therefore it is possible that the role of 
vendors and their representatives is inaccurately valued in the conceptual works in the 
literature and anecdotal works (Pope 2002). In other words, trust, sharing information, 
training, and reliability that characterize a cooperative relationship between physician and 
vendor, which in turn leads to physician agency for vendor, in fact works as a double edge 
sword. Although it may increase the quality of care, it also has a negative effect on hospital 
procurement strategies for physician preference items (PPI). Scholars (Schneller and 
Wilson 2009) argue that in certain strategies for purchasing PPIs, supplier (vendor) and 
their representative are an integral part of the decision making body. Therefore hospitals 
should screen the relationship of vendor with physician, as it has detrimental effects on 
hospital initiatives to make more efficient decisions. 
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H5b. Agency role of physician for hospital is positively associated with IMD 
standardization. 
This hypothesis is strongly supported by the results of statistical analysis (β=0.356, t-
value=4.322, p<.01). These statistical results confirm the proposition of this study. This 
study hypothesize that there is a positive association between the agency role of physician 
for hospital and the standardization of the process of purchasing IMDs.  This empirically 
proves the conceptual arguments of prior studies (Burns et al. 2009; Montgomery and 
Schneller 2007; Transparency Market Research 2013; Streit et al. 2012) that posit when 
physician’s goals are aligned with hospital, i.e. physician acts as agent of hospital, they 
protect hospital chips and will be the voice of hospital in negotiations for purchasing IMDs. 
 
H5c. Hospital-Vendor relationship is positively associated with IMD 
standardization. 
This hypothesis is strongly supported by the results of statistical analysis of the structural 
model (β=0.23, t-value=4.071, p<.01). The path coefficient indicates a strong association 
(β>=0.20). This conforms to the proposition of this study that predicts a positive 
association between a well-established relationship among vendor and hospital and the 
standardization of the process of purchasing IMDs. For hospital executives, this means that 
a positive relationship with supplier (vendor) is of essence for success of implantation of a 
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standardization strategy. Empirical support for this hypothesis conforms with prior 
literature that argue maintaining a good relationship with supplier, e.g. exchange of 
information, supplier development, etc. will lead to higher focal firm performance (Modi 
and Mabert 2007). 
 
H6. Standardization of implantable medical devices is positively associated 
with performance. 
Finally, the last hypothesis of this study is strongly supported by the statistical analysis 
(β=0.861, t-value=3.873, p<.01). This is in agreement with extant literature both in the 
operations management and in the healthcare management. Literature holds that 
standardization of the process of purchasing physician preference items (such as IMDs) 
leads to higher cost containment (Burns et al. 2009; Montgomery and Schneller 2007; 
Transparency Market Research 2013; Streit et al. 2012). What makes this study different 
from prior research is the fact that this study defines performance as both efficiency and 
quality of IMDs. Performance in this study is defined as “The extent to which the total cost 
of ownership of cardiac and orthopedic IMD is proportionate to the quality of IMD; and 
utilization of a this IMD enhances the quality of care, e.g. reduces the length of stay, 
reduces the surgery site infections, and increases the rate of progress in gaining experience 
and knowledge among clinicians.” In other words, contrary to the conventional belief that 
reducing cost of care will also reduce quality of care, this study offers empirical evidence 
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that containing the cost of purchasing IMDs through standardization efforts, not only does 
not reduce the quality of care, but also improves it, i.e. reduces the length of stay, increases 
the productivity of training among clinicians, and reduces surgery site infections. For 
hospital managers this falsifies the anecdotal belief that implementation of standardization 
strategies will lead to lower quality of care. In other words, this study empirically proves 
that standardization efforts, improve the hospital productivity both in terms of quality and 
cost of care. 
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Chapter 6 
6. Implications, Limitation, Future Research, and Conclusion 
This chapter summarizes the implication of this study for both academicians and clinicians. 
Moreover, this chapter discusses the limitations of this research, and makes proposition for 
future research. Finally a conclusion for the entire study will be proposed. 
6. 1.  Implications for Academicians 
To the best of author’s knowledge, this study is among the very first studies that look into 
the complex issue of service triads in procurement of cardiac and orthopedic surgical 
implants setting. In particular this study proposes a framework for the study of complex 
relationships between physician, hospital, and vendor of implantable medical devices. This 
study also empirically tests the effect of standardization initiatives for purchasing cardiac 
and orthopedic IMDs on the efficiency and quality, i.e. performance. The findings of this 
study are valuable for researchers who work in healthcare setting, procurement setting, and 
service triads. 
This study looks at the service triad from the lens of agency theory. This endeavor is among 
the very first studies (Zhang et al. 2014; Modi et al. 2015) that investigate the agency 
problem in a triadic setting. In other words, instead of the dyadic framework of principal 
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agent problem, this study takes a new approach and investigates the problem in a triadic 
setting. That is to say, not only this study examines the effect of principal monitoring on 
the relationship between multiple agents, but also it investigates the effect of one agency 
relationships on another. Finally it also investigates the effect of relationship between 
multiple agents on the performance of principal.  
Moreover, this study proposes and then empirically tests the mechanisms that principal 
should use to reduce the agency problem in a triadic setting. To the best of author’s 
knowledge, this study is among the very first studies that empirically test these propositions 
in procurement of orthopedic and cardiac surgical implants setting. On the same note, this 
study, operationalizes and validates measurement instruments for those mechanisms in a 
triadic setting. 
Furthermore, based on previous research, this study conceptualizes and empirically 
validates the construct of standardization. In particular, this study conceptualizes that 
standardization of IMDs is “the extent to which hospital has standard processes for 
managing, controlling, and coordinating the purchasing process of orthopedic and cardiac 
implantable medical devices”. This study then proposes an instrument for measuring 
standardization, and validates this instrument. 
Finally, this study conceptualizes and operationalizes the performance. In particular, this 
study defines the performance as “the extent to which the utilization of certain IMDs 
enhance the financial and medical quality of care in procedures that involve such IMDs”. 
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This study conceptualizes this variable in a way to capture both efficiency and quality of 
care. This is a relatively comprehensive view of the performance. This concept then has 
been operationalized, validated, and used in this study. 
6. 2.  Implications for Practitioners 
This study has multiple implications for three different groups of practitioners. First, 
hospital executives and decision makers e.g. operating room directors, chief financial 
officers will benefit from the results of this study. Second, medical practitioners, e.g. 
physicians, other physicians who whose work are connected to operating rooms, and 
operating room staff could utilize the results of this study to improve the quality of their 
work. Third, IMD manufacturers and vendors of cardiac and orthopedic devices and their 
representatives would benefit from the results of this study. In the next sections 
implications of this study for each group will be discussed. 
6. 2. 1. Implications for Hospital Executives 
The results of this research enable hospital executives to develop and employ mechanism 
to control the triadic relationship that forms between them, vendor of IMDs and physicians. 
Specifically, hospitals can use the results of this study to control and influence the 
relationship between vendor and physician, and maintain hospitals’ intermediary (bridge) 
position. Hospitals can also use the results of this study, to identify factors that affect the 
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success of their standardization initiatives. By acquiring knowledge about these factors, 
they can redeploy their resources to ensure the success of standardization efforts. 
Moreover, this study shows the significance of relationship between standardization of the 
process of purchasing IMDs and efficiency and quality of care of those implantable medical 
devices. This is an important implication for hospital executives who are in pursuit of 
strategies to obtain better cost and quality of care for purchasing IMDs. 
6. 2. 2. Implications for Medical Practitioners 
This study has practical implications for medical practitioners, i.e. orthopedic and cardiac 
physicians, physicians in other specialties, and nurses who are involved in IMD procedures. 
This research depicts a clear picture of the antecedents and consequences of the relationship 
between hospital, physician, and vendor. This helps clinicians to better understand the 
consequences of their preferences or decisions. According to scholars (Streit et al. 2013; 
Burns et al. 2009) clinicians usually underestimate the effects of their decisions on the 
efficiency of implantable medical devices. Same studies argue that when clinician become 
aware of the important repercussions of their decisions, they tend to cooperate with 
hospital. This study gives medical practitioners, specifically cardiac and orthopedic 
physicians, a comprehensive vision about the antecedents and consequences of their 
preferences and decisions. When clinicians know the effect of selecting a particular IMD, 
they appreciate the fact that their sub-optimal decisions or preferences will reduce the 
performance and in turn leads to lower productivity of hospital. Clinicians understand that 
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they are in the same boat with the hospital. This study draws a holistic picture of the 
dynamics of IMD purchasing for medical practitioners that empowers them to choose their 
side wisely. They realize that having a cooperative relationship with hospital and acting as 
the agent of hospital would be beneficial for them in the long run. 
6. 2. 3. Implications for IMD Manufacturers 
This research has practical implications for manufacturers and vendors of the IMD devices. 
Manufacturers of the IMD devices will benefit from the outcomes of this research by 
understanding that their traditional method of business is in jeopardy. In other words they 
observe that hospitals, as well as their payers such as CMS, are becoming more and more 
alert about the relationship between physicians and vendors (US Government 
Accountability Office 2012; Sismondo 2013). Healthcare reform and its consequences will 
lead to a paradigm shift in healthcare expenditure in The United States. This paradigm shift 
in the long run will render the strong relationship between manufacturer and physicians 
obsolete. On one hand, manufacturers will be under scrutiny and monitoring to reveal their 
relationships with physicians. On the other hand, under the new healthcare payment 
regimen, hospitals will no longer be able to afford the extravagant spending of their 
physicians. Moreover, more and more physicians are being employed by hospitals or 
engage into certain contractual agreements with hospitals to increase the productivity of 
the hospital. All these factors weaken the effects of manufacturers’ traditional method of 
bypassing the hospital and incentivizing physicians. The results of this study show 
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significant support that standardization strategies have a positive effect on cost and clinical 
performance. For manufacturers this means that in future more hospitals will implement 
such strategies. Therefore manufacturers also should change their strategy of doing 
business to work in tandem with hospitals, and try to build a cooperative relationship with 
them. This will lead to a higher benefit for manufacturers sooner or later. 
6. 3.  Limitations 
Although this research has made significant academic and practical contributions, it has 
some limitations. First of all, despite the fact that large-scale survey method has multiple 
advantages, it should be noted that such data couldn’t intensely investigate the phenomenon 
under research (Kerlinger and Lee 1973). Primary data, by its nature, can show the 
relationships between variables, but it cannot render explanation of why such relationships 
exist. 
Moreover, data has been gathered from one official in each hospital. This single respondent 
approach disqualifies this study from providing sufficient and precise insight about 
complicated management issues such as service triads (Venkatraman and Grant 1986). 
Specifically since the subject of study is a service triad in healthcare setting, it is more 
appropriate to gather data from each party involved in this triad, and match them before 
performing further analysis. In an effort to tackle this issue, this study gathered data from 
both chief financial officers, and operating room directors in hospitals. However the 
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number of responses from the same hospital was so infinitesimal that did not enable author 
to pair the points of data. Furthermore, the data gathered in this study, is cross sectional 
data that reflects the respondents’ point of view in a certain point of time. This type of 
snapshot data only enables author to argue that the results of this study reveal the hospitals’ 
perspective on the problem at the time of collecting data. 
6. 4.  Future Research 
What has been explained in the previous section as limitations of this research also shows 
great opportunities for future research. Specifically by reviewing the results of this 
analysis, and by acquiring the opinion of experts in this field, several avenues for future 
research exist. 
Although only source of data for this study was primary data from respondents in hospitals, 
all hospitals have been identified with their name, zip code, state, and bed size. This enables 
future researchers to match secondary data about these hospitals with primary data gathered 
in this research and conduct new studies to further investigate the phenomenon under 
research. One of the specific characteristics of healthcare industry, and specifically 
hospitals, is that there is abundance of secondary data available either for free or for 
purchase from different sources. This gives a competitive edge to this research over other 
researches done on service triads in other industries. 
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Another avenue for future research is collecting primary data from different sources and 
matching them. In other words, since the study is on the issue of service triads, one can 
gather data from the three entities involved in triads and match them, before performing 
statistical analysis. This will elevate the unit of analysis to triadic level. To the best of 
author’s knowledge, this type of research is very scares, due to its hard to accomplish nature 
of data collection. 
Furthermore, this research can be extended to a longitudinal study that gathers data at 
multiple points in time. Specifically, since the standardization of IMDs is an effort that is 
considered to show its fruits in the long run, this would be a great opportunity for future 
researchers to gather data before and after such effort and conduct a longitudinal study. 
However, one should be aware of the time consuming nature of such research before 
entering this realm. 
Another avenue for future research is to consider physician compensation as a control 
variable. Although this study controls for the employment status of the physicians, but it 
will be prudent to also control for the compensation of physicians, as one can argue that 
physicians who are better compensated will have different reactions to the incentives from 
either vendor or hospital and will show different behavior in their relationships with these 
two parties. This is a very important issue. For instance, scholars (Said et al. 2003) have 
done extensive research on compensation contracts, which include both financial and non-
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financial measures. This will enable researcher to examine if the proposed associations will 
change for different categories of physician compensations. 
6. 5.  Conclusion 
This research is an empirical study that investigates the issue of service triads in 
procurement of orthopedic and cardiac surgical implants setting. This study provides an 
integrated theoretical framework that connects the mechanisms that hospital should utilize 
to influence the relationships in a procurement service triad. This service triad forms when 
hospital reaches out to IMD market for purchasing cardiac and orthopedic implants. 
Further, this study shows that these triadic relationships affect hospitals’ efforts to 
standardize the process of purchasing cardiac and orthopedic IMDs. Finally this study 
shows the association between the standardization efforts and the clinical and financial 
performance. 
To be precise, this study supports the proposition that vendor cooperation mechanisms for 
physician increase the agency role of physician for vendor. This research, on one hand, 
finds empirical support for the proposed negative relationship between the hospital 
monitoring and the agency role of physician for vendor. On the other hand, this research 
empirically support the hypothesized positive relationship between hospital monitoring 
and the agency role of physician for hospital. This study also finds empirical support for 
the proposed relationship between hospital cooperation mechanisms and a strong bond 
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(agency role) between physician and hospital. In the same vein, results show that hospital 
cooperation mechanisms increase the cooperative relationship between hospital and 
vendor. Moreover, results of this study show that for a physician, higher levels of agency 
for hospital are associated with lower levels of agency for vendor.  
Afterwards, this study finds empirical support that (a) the agency role of physicians for 
vendor is negatively associated with standardization of IMD purchasing procedures, (b) 
the agency role of physician for hospital positively affect the standardization of the process 
of purchasing IMDs, and (c) there is a positive association between a well-established 
relationship among vendor and hospital and the standardization of the process of 
purchasing IMDs. Finally this study finds empirical evidence that standardization of 
implantable medical devices is positively associated with performance. This is in 
accordance with extant literature. However, this study stands out as it defines performance 
as both efficiency and quality of IMDs.  
From the theoretical standpoint, this study gathers data from hospitals all across the United 
States to test the proposed relationships and associations. In paucity of empirical studies 
that investigate the service triad in healthcare setting, this study applies the notion of 
service triads to procurement in healthcare setting. By doing so this study extends the 
conceptual researches of other scholars who have worked on this subject, and contributes 
to procurement, healthcare, agency theory, and service triads literature (Wu et al. 2010; 
Wu and Choi 2005; Choi and Wu 2009; Zhang et al. 2014). 
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From the practical point of view, this study provides hospital officials with detailed 
recommendations to achieve higher performance. Particularly, this study suggests that 
hospitals need to use certain cooperation as well as monitoring mechanisms to affect the 
relationships in the service triad that forms between vendor, hospital, and physician in 
purchasing IMDs. In other words, in order to have the upper hand and enjoy the benefits 
of bridge position, hospital need to monitor the relationship between vendor and physician, 
and maintain cooperative relationship with physician, as well as vendor. Moreover this 
study recommends standardization as an effective mechanism that hospital should utilize 
to save in cost, and increase the clinical quality of IMDs. Looking at the bigger picture of 
today’s healthcare situation, this is a specific and significant step towards reducing cost of 
care and increasing the quality of care in a narrow but very important sector of healthcare 
in The United States. 
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Appendix A 
Construct Definition 
 
Construct Definition Example Adapted from 
Reference(s) 
Hospital 
Cooperation 
Mechanisms 
for Physician 
Actions and incentives 
that hospital takes to 
motivate physicians to 
perform in line with the 
hospital objectives in 
purchasing IMDs and 
IMD services, i.e. 
balanced quality and 
cost. 
Hospital supports physician 
by providing well-trained 
nurses and convenient OR 
blocks. Hospital involves 
physician in making 
decisions. Hospital involves 
physicians in Value Analysis 
Teams (VAT), and values 
their decisions in assessing 
IMDs and vendor service. 
Hospital implements gain 
sharing programs for 
physicians. 
(Dobrzykowski and 
Tarafdar 2015; 
Gulati et al. 2005; 
Gulati et al. 2012) 
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Construct Definition Example Adapted from 
Reference(s) 
Hospital 
Cooperation 
Mechanisms 
for Vendor 
Action and incentives 
that hospital takes to 
motivate vendor to 
perform in line with the 
hospital objectives in 
purchasing IMDs and 
IMD services. 
Hospital has mutual 
investments with vendor. 
Hospital has open 
communication channels 
with vendor to receive 
updated information. 
Hospital arranges frequent 
meetings between vendors 
and hospital procurement 
team. 
(Handfield & 
Bechtel, 2002; S. 
M. L. Lee, D.H.; 
Schniederjans, 
M.J., 2011) 
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Construct Definition Example Adapted from 
Reference(s) 
Vendor 
Cooperation 
Mechanisms 
for Physicians 
Actions and incentives 
that vendor of IMDs 
takes to motivate 
physicians to perform 
in line with its 
objectives in selling 
IMDs and IMD 
services to hospital. 
Example: Physicians receive 
financial remuneration from 
vendor in exchange of 
consulting, royalties for 
patents, and honoraria for 
speeches. Physician receives 
research grants from vendor 
in exchange of endorsing 
vendor and higher utilization 
of its IMDs. Vendor 
provides the physician (who 
promotes the vendor service) 
with high quality training 
and support. 
(Gulati et al. 2005; 
Gulati et al. 2012) 
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Construct Definition Example Adapted from 
Reference(s) 
Hospital 
Monitoring on 
P-V 
Relationship 
The extent to which 
hospital screens the 
relationship between 
IMD vendor and 
physician. 
Example: Hospital reviews 
the available public records 
about the financial 
relationship between P-V. 
This could be done through 
means like Sunshine act for 
teaching hospitals, etc. 
Hospital also asks physicians 
to declare if they have any 
mutual financial interest 
with vendor. 
(Li and Choi 2009; 
Heide et al. 2007; 
Tosi et al. 1997; 
van der Valk and 
van Iwaarden 
2011) 
168 
 
Construct Definition Example Adapted from 
Reference(s) 
Physician as 
Hospital’s 
Agent  
The extent to which, in 
the process of vendor 
selection and 
evaluation, physician 
has cost and quality 
concerns similar to 
those of hospital. 
Physician defends 
hospital stakes in these 
negotiations. 
Example:  Physician speaks 
on behalf of hospital in 
procurement negotiations to 
purchase IMDs and IMD 
services. Physician uses 
his/her professional and 
academic knowledge to 
defend hospital’s stakes in 
price negotiations. 
(Gulati et al. 2005; 
Schneller et al. 
2006; Gulati et al. 
2012; Montgomery 
and Schneller 
2007) 
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Construct Definition Example Adapted from 
Reference(s) 
Physician as 
Vendor’s 
Agent  
The extent to which, in 
IMD and IMD services 
purchasing process, 
physician promotes 
vendor. 
Example: Physician speaks 
on behalf of vendor in 
procurement negotiations, 
and threatens hospital to take 
his/her business to another 
hospital if the vendor is not 
selected. 
(Montgomery and 
Schneller 2007; 
Burns et al. 2009) 
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Construct Definition Example Adapted from 
Reference(s) 
Hospital-
Vendor 
Relationship 
The extent to which, in 
purchasing process 
interactions, hospital 
rely on vendor for the 
optimum balance of 
quality and price of 
IMDs and IMD 
services, vendor and 
hospital do not abuse 
their market power, and 
they openly 
communicate relevant 
and required 
information. 
Example: Vendors provide 
hospitals with updated 
information on new product 
availability and FDA 
approvals. Vendors assure 
hospital that they can 
provide the required quality 
of IMDs to meet hospital 
needs. Hospital commits to 
use a particular vendor in 
return for appropriate price. 
Vendors facilitate hospital 
IMD inventory management. 
They provide inventory on a 
JIT basis on the day of 
surgery. 
(Gulati et al. 2005; 
Gulati et al. 2012; 
Montgomery and 
Schneller 2007; 
Schneller et al. 
2006) 
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Construct Definition Example Adapted from 
Reference(s) 
Standardization 
of IMDs 
The extent to which 
hospital has standard 
processes for 
managing, controlling, 
and coordinating the 
purchasing process of 
orthopedic and cardiac 
implantable medical 
devices.  
Example: Hospital is able to 
“orchestrate” the process of 
purchasing cardiac and 
orthopedic IMDs through 
implementing strategies like 
“price cap” model and 
“formulary” model. 
(Montgomery and 
Schneller 2007)  
 
Construct Definition Reference(s) 
Performance The extent to which the total cost of ownership of a 
cardiac and orthopedic IMD is proportionate to the 
quality of IMD; and utilization of this IMD enhances 
the quality of care, e.g. reduces the length of stay, 
reduces the surgery site infections, and increases the 
rate of progress in gaining experience and knowledge 
among clinicians.  
(Ding, 2014; 
Institute of 
Medicine, 2001)  
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Construct Definition Reference(s) 
Hospital Size Small / Small to Medium / Medium / Medium to 
Large / Large (The number of beds, which a hospital 
has been designed and constructed to contain is used 
as a proxy) 
(L. B. Li, W. C., 
2006) 
Hospital 
Teaching Status 
Teaching / Non-Teaching (Li 2006) 
Hospital 
Ownership 
For Profit / Not For Profit, Public (Yuan et al. 2000) 
Complexity Complexity is measured by proxy of case mix index. 
Case mix Index refers to the sum total of the 
diagnoses (diseases) present in a population, and 
high- and low-resource therapies required to manage 
them, considered as a single unit for the purpose of 
resource analysis and allocation planning.  
(Carter, Newhouse, 
& Relles, 1990)  
Quality Quality is being measured by hospital reputation 
proxy. Hospital perception of public judgment about 
its ability to deliver high quality of care and 
willingness of physicians to practice at the hospital.  
  
(Hibbard, Stockard, 
& Tusler, 2005)  
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Construct Definition Reference(s) 
Physician 
Employment 
Status 
The extent to which the cardiac and orthopedic 
physicians who work in the hospital are independent 
from hospital. 
  
Interviews, 
(Lawton R Burns et 
al., 2009)  
Hospital Market 
Share 
The portion of cardiac and orthopedic IMD 
procedures market controlled by the hospital. 
  
(Hibbard et al., 
2005) 
Vendor 
Competition 
The extent to which different vendors manufacture 
similar type of specific IMDs.  
  
(Handfield & 
Bechtel, 2002)  
Hospital 
Dependence on 
Vendor 
The extent to which hospital considers vendor as its 
only source of input, or key supplier of IMDs, e.g. 
vendors has a unique product which is currently 
protected by patent. 
  
(Handfield & 
Bechtel, 2002)  
Vendor’s 
Direct-to-
Consumer 
Marketing 
Hospital perception of the extent to which vendor 
convinces physicians about superiority of their 
product through means such as advertisement and 
research publication.   
  
Interviews, 
(Ogunwale et al., 
2009) 
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Construct Definition Reference(s) 
Social 
Desirability of 
Respondents 
“Social desirability in an experiment occurs when a 
participant responds in accordance to social norms, or 
in a manner in which they believe the researcher 
would desire, rather than how they truly feel or 
believe.” 
  
(Crowne & 
Marlowe, 1960)  
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Appendix B 
Initial Measurement Items and References (Entering Q Sort) 
 
Item Reference(s) 
Vendor Cooperation Mechanisms for Physician (Handfield and Bechtel 
2002) 
Vendor provides physician with professional knowledge and 
evidence-based information. 
(Schneller et al. 2006) 
Vendor provides physician with up to date information about IMDs 
and IMD services. 
(Wu et al. 2010) 
Vendor dedicates skillful representatives for physicians in 
exchange of endorsing their products and services. 
(Schneller et al. 2006) 
Vendor provides physicians (who advocate the vendor) with 
required assistance and support in performing IMD procedures. 
(Wu et al. 2010) 
Vendor set up tours for physicians to visit other hospitals that use 
their products. 
(Burns et al. 2009) 
Vendor provides physician with research grants in exchange of 
advocating its product and service. 
(Montgomery and 
Schneller 2007) 
Vendor compensates physician who endorse its products for 
consulting services. 
 
Vendor pays speech honoraria to physicians who support the use of 
its products and services. 
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Item Reference(s) 
Vendor pays patent royalty to physicians who promote the use of 
its products and services. 
 
Hospital Monitoring on P-V Relationship  
Physicians have to declare if they have any mutual interests with 
vendor. 
(Li and Choi 2009) 
Physicians have to declare if they earn patent royalties from 
vendor’s company. 
(Tosi et al. 1997) 
Physicians have to declare if they receive payments in exchange of 
consulting for vendor. 
(van der Valk and van 
Iwaarden 2011) 
Physicians have to declare if they receive honoraria in exchange of 
speeches for vendor. 
(Burns et al. 2009) 
Hospital screens payments that physicians receive from vendor in 
exchange of higher utilization IMDs. 
(Heide et al. 2007) 
Hospital reviews public records to find out about the financial 
exchanges between its physicians and vendors.  
Interviews 
Hospital screens research grants that physicians receive from 
vendors in exchange of higher utilization of IMDs. 
 
Hospital Cooperation Mechanisms for Physician (Burns and Muller 
2008) 
Hospital dedicates adequate operating room blocks to physicians. (Cuellar and Gertler 
2006) 
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Item Reference(s) 
Hospital’s operating rooms utilization is optimized. (Witt and Jacobs 2010) 
Hospital provides physician with adequate number of nurses. (Burns et al. 2009) 
Hospital involves physicians in decision-making. (Schneller et al. 2006) 
Hospital communicates evidence-based data with physicians about 
the effect of their decisions on the balance of cost and quality in 
purchasing IMDs and IMD services. 
(Montgomery and 
Schneller 2007) 
Hospital passes on savings from IMDs and IMD services cost-
cutting efforts to physician’s unit. 
(Burns and Muller 
2008) 
Hospital rewards physician for decisions that are in line with the 
goals of hospital in purchasing IMDs. 
 
Hospital has gain sharing programs for physicians.  
Hospital has productivity-based incentives for physicians.  
Hospital Cooperation Mechanisms for Vendor (H-V CM)  
Hospital Cooperation Mechanisms for Vendor (Lambert et al. 1997) 
Hospital has mutual investment with vendors. (Lee et al. 2011) 
Hospital has open communication channels with vendors. (Montgomery and 
Schneller 2007) 
Hospital arrange frequent meeting between vendors and hospital 
procurement officers. 
(Burns et al. 2009) 
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Item Reference(s) 
Hospital commits a certain volume to the vendor in exchange of 
balanced quality and price. 
 
Please do not answer this question.  
Hospital signs long-term contracts with vendor in exchange of 
balanced quality and price. 
 
Hospital promises future contracts to vendors who communicate 
information with hospital. 
 
Hospital promises future contracts to vendors who make specific 
investments for hospital needs. 
 
Physician as Vendor’s Agent  
Physicians advocate products and services that vendor provides. (Burns et al. 2009) 
Physicians have longstanding tenure with the vendor that they 
promote. 
(Li and Choi 2009) 
Physicians force hospital to purchase IMDs at prices dictated by 
vendor. 
(Montgomery and 
Schneller 2007) 
Physicians speak on behalf of vendor in purchasing process. (Burns et al. 2009) 
Physicians threaten hospital to take their business elsewhere if 
hospital purchases IMDs and IMD services from another vendor. 
 
Physicians rather drop their hospital privilege than abiding by 
hospital’s decision to purchase IMDs and IMD services from 
another vendor. 
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Item Reference(s) 
Physician has significant leverage in trying to influence hospital 
decisions over which vendor to use. 
 
Physician’s professional identity and interest overlaps with that of 
vendor. 
 
Physician as Hospital’s Agent  
Physician’s professional identity and interest overlaps with that of 
hospital. 
(Burns et al. 2009) 
In value analysis meetings, physicians use their professional 
knowledge to help hospital.  
(Schneller et al. 2006) 
Physicians share their professional experience with hospital in 
regards to IMDs and IMD procedures. 
(Li and Choi 2009) 
Physicians have harmonious objectives with hospital in balancing 
the cost and quality of IMDs and IMD services. 
(Gulati et al. 2012) 
Physicians trust hospital in decisions about balancing the cost and 
quality of IMDs and IMD services. 
(Schneller et al. 2006) 
Physician approve of hospital’s efforts to cut costs of implantable 
medical devices and their related services. 
(Burns et al. 2009) 
Physicians believe to be in the same boat with hospital, and they 
both are being paid less for implant surgery. 
(Burns et al. 2009) 
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Item Reference(s) 
Physicians follow deliberations by value analysis team (VAT) of 
the hospital to make decision to use a given product or work with a 
given vendor. 
(Burns et al. 2009) 
Physicians accept decisions of materials managers or O.R. 
managers to use a given IMD or work with a given vendor. 
(Burns et al. 2009) 
Hospital Vendor Relationship  
Vendor’s professional identity and prestige depends on providing 
IMDs and rendering IMD services to the hospital. 
(Burns et al. 2009) 
Vendor provides hospital with the required quality of IMDs, and 
IMD services. 
(Montgomery and 
Schneller 2007) 
Vendor delivers IMDs and IMD services on time. (Burns et al. 2009) 
Vendor accurately supplies the IMDs and IMD services.  (Schneller et al. 2006) 
Vendor provides hospital with updated knowledge on the quality of 
new products. 
 
Vendor helps hospital with IMD inventory management through 
techniques like JIT. 
 
Vendor does not abuse its market power to impose higher prices.  
Hospital does not abuse its market share to gain unreasonable 
lower prices. 
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Item Reference(s) 
Vendor communicates information with hospital about the effect of 
using certain IMDs and IMD services on the balance of quality and 
cost. 
 
 Standardization of IMDs  
Hospital manages, controls, and coordinates the process of 
purchasing IMDs through negotiation with vendor and physician. 
(Montgomery and 
Schneller 2007) 
Hospital restricts the number of approved vendors from which the 
cardiac IMDs are purchased. 
(Schneller et al. 2006) 
Hospital restricts the number of approved vendors from which the 
orthopedic IMDs are purchased. 
(Burns et al. 2009) 
Hospital is restricts the price paid for particular types of cardiac 
IMDs. 
 
Hospital restricts the price paid for particular types of orthopedic 
IMDs. 
 
 Performance   
The total cost of cardiac/orthopedic IMD procedures is 
proportionate with the quality of IMDs and IMD services rendered 
by vendor. 
(Burns et al. 2009) 
Hospital has generated cost savings from efforts to balance 
cardiac/orthopedic IMDs and IMD services cost and quality.  
(Ding 2014) 
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Item Reference(s) 
The total cost of cardiac/orthopedic IMD procedures divided by 
patient-days is lower than last year in this hospital. 
 
The total cost of all cardiac/orthopedic IMD procedures divided 
by patient admissions is lower than last year in this hospital. 
 
Serious surgical site infections for cardiac/orthopedic procedures 
that involve organs or implants are reduced. 
(US Government 
Accountability Office 
2012) 
Average length of stay for orthopedic and/or cardiac IMD patients 
is reduced. 
(Ding 2014) 
The rate of progress in gaining experience and new skills, among 
cardiac and/or orthopedic physician and medical staff is improved. 
(US Government 
Accountability Office 
2012) 
 Control Variables  
Hospital Size (Scale) (Li 2006) 
Complexity (Hospital Case Mix Index) (Scale) Interviews 
Hospital Ownership (Multiple Choice) (Yuan et al. 2000) 
Hospital Teaching Status (Multiple Choice)  
Quality (Hospital Reputation) (Scale)  (Yuan et al. 2000) 
Physician Employment Status (Percentage) Interviews 
(Burns et al. 2009)  
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Item Reference(s) 
Hospital Market Share (Percentage) (Yuan et al. 2000) 
Vendor Competition (Scale) (Handfield and Bechtel 
2002) 
Hospital Dependence on Vendor (Scale)  (Handfield and 
Bechtel 2002) 
Vendor’s Direct-to-Consumer Marketing (Scale)  Interviews 
(Ogunwale et al. 2009) 
Social Desirability Scale  
On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I 
thought too little of my ability.  
(Crowne and Marlowe 
1960) 
There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in 
authority even though I knew they were right. 
 
No matter whom I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener.  
I don’t find it particularly difficult to get along with loud mouthed, 
obnoxious people. 
 
I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone’s 
feelings. 
 
I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.  
When I don’t know something I don’t at all mind admitting it.  
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Item Reference(s) 
I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different 
from my own. 
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Appendix C 
Q Sort Study Instruction 
Introduction 
Thank you for accepting to participate in this phase of this important research. The 
main objective of this research is to investigate mechanisms that hospital can utilize to 
increase the efficiency and quality of cardiac and orthopedic implantable medical devices. 
This Q-Sort study is designed to refine, review, and finally validate the measurement 
instrument (questionnaire) that will be used in a large-scale survey. This survey will be 
sent to operating room directors and chief financial officers of hospitals all across The 
United States. 
Q-Sort is a matching technique. Administrator will give you a brief introduction of 
this research, including: backgrounds, purposes, framework (conceptual model), and 
context of this research. Then he will give you a list of concepts with specific definitions 
and a pool of statements that are supposed to be associated with the mentioned concepts. 
Finally he will ask you to match these statements with the given concepts.  
Instructions  
1. Please carefully read all the given concepts and related definitions (Each of these 
concepts are printed on an envelope). 
186 
 
2. Please carefully read all the statements (Each of these statements is printed on a 
note-card) and match them with associated concept based on your judgments. 
3. Whenever you found a match please put the note-cards into the appropriate envelop. 
4. Please feel free to put statement that you believe do not belong to any envelope in 
the envelope titled “Not Applicable”.  
5. Please mark concepts or statements that you find unclear. 
6. Please review your choice before submitting it to the researcher. 
7. During the entire process, you are allowed to communicate with the administrator 
to ask for clarification about the process, concepts, or statements. 
Author is pleased to share the results of this study with you. If you are interested in 
this study, please contact the researcher for further details. 
Thank you very much for your time and effort.  
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Appendix D  
Final Questionnaire  
 
Hospital Purchasing for Cardiac and Orthopedic Implantable Medical Devices 
ADULT RESEARCH - INFORMED CONSENT INFORMATION 
Principal Investigator: Dr. Anand Kunnathur, Executive Dean of College of Business, 
(419) 530-5644 
Assistant Investigator: Vafa Saboorideilami, PhD Candidate, (419) 329-0408 
Purpose: You are invited to participate in the research project entitled, Hospital 
Purchasing for Cardiac and Orthopedic Implantable Medical Devices, which is being 
conducted at the University of Toledo under the direction of Dr. Anand Kunnathur, and 
Vafa Saboorideilami. The purpose of this study is explore the mechanisms that hospital 
could use to efficiently purchase implantable medical devices. 
Description of Procedures: This research will take place in University of Toledo 
from June 2014 to June 2015. You will be asked to complete a questionnaire in which you 
will answer questions about purchasing implantable medical devices in your hospital. Your 
participation will take about 15 minutes. 
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Potential Risks: There are minimal risks to participation in this study, including 
loss of confidentiality. Answering this survey does not cause any risk to you. 
Potential Benefits: The only direct benefit to you if you participate in this research 
may be that you will learn about how business researches are run and may learn more about 
purchasing implantable medical devices. Others may benefit by learning about the results 
of this research. 
Confidentiality: The researchers will make every effort to prevent anyone who is 
not on the research team from knowing that you provided this information, or what that 
information is. The data generated through this survey will be kept anonymous (without 
any information that could identify the respondents). Although we will make every effort 
to protect your confidentiality, there is a low risk that this might be breached. 
Voluntary Participation: Your refusal to participate in this study will involve no 
penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled and will not affect your 
relationship with The University of Toledo or any other institution. In addition, you may 
discontinue participation at any time without any penalty or loss of benefits. 
Contact Information: Before you decide to accept this invitation to take part in 
this study, you may ask any questions that you might have. If you have any questions at 
any time before, during or after your participation you should contact a member of the 
research team Vafa Saboorideilami, at (419) 329-0408. If you have questions beyond those 
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answered by the research team or your rights as a research subject or research-related 
injuries, please feel free to contact the IRB Chair at (419) 530-2844. 
The University of Toledo Social, Behavioral, & Educational Institutional Review Board 
The research project described in this consent has been reviewed and approved by 
the University of Toledo SBE IRB for the period of time specified below. 
SBE IRB #: 200176 Project Start Date: 04/23/14 
By clicking on to the next page and beginning the survey, you are stating that you 
have read and accept the information above and are giving your consent to participate in 
this research. You are also confirming that you are 18 years old or over. 
Instructions 
Respondent: "Director of the Operating Rooms" and/or "Chief Financial Officer” 
This survey will take about 15 minutes of your time 
Please identify a critical orthopedic and a cardiac implantable medical device 
(IMD) that you are familiar with. A critical IMD may reflect any of the following features: 
- The largest cost component of the surgery, 
- The most medically important device in the surgery,  
- The purchased IMD on which you spend most of your time 
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- The most difficult IMD to obtain, volatile price, the longest lead-time, etc. 
Of the available suppliers for this critical IMD, identify one who is the primary 
supplier of these IMDs. Of the available physicians who perform procedures using these 
IMDs, identify two who are most important to the hospital (one for each specialty). This 
survey focuses on identifying factors that characterize the relationship between you 
(hospital), your physician, and your vendor. Please respond to all statements and questions 
in reference to your vendor and physician. Following statements are about relationships, 
and dynamics among you (hospital), (a) your physician, and (b) your vendor.  
Where applicable, please check the box under the number that best applies to your 
hospital, using the following scale: (1) Strongly Disagree to (7) Strongly Agree. Otherwise, 
please use the drop-down menu, and select a value from the available options. 
Thank you again for participating in this survey. 
Best regards, 
Vafa Saboorideilami 
(419) 329-0408 
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Note: Questions that are dropped after exploratory factor analysis are shown in 
italic. 
General Questions 
Role 
What is your position in hospital? 
 Operating Room Director  
 Chief Financial Officer  
 Other:   
Name  
Hospital Name: 
 Zip  
Hospital Zip Code: 
State  
Hospital State: 
IMD  
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Which OR (Cardiac or Orthopedic) procedures are you considering while 
responding to this survey? 
 Cardiac  
 Orthopedic  
 Both  
 Other:   
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Vendor Cooperation Mechanism for Physician 
Q-1. Vendor communicates professional knowledge and evidence-based 
information with physician. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-2. Vendor renders physician with updated information about current trends in 
IMD industry. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-3. Vendor dedicates skillful representatives for physicians in exchange of 
endorsing their products and services. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-4. Vendor provides physicians (who advocate the vendor) with required 
assistance and support in performing IMD procedures. 
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Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-5. Vendor set up tours for physicians to visit other hospitals that use their 
products. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-6. Vendor invites physicians (who advocate the vendor) to training sessions 
and seminars. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-7. Vendor provides physician with research grants in exchange of advocating 
its product and service. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-8. Vendor compensates physician who endorse its products for consulting 
services. 
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Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-9. Vendor pays speech honoraria to physicians who support the use of its 
products and services. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-10. Vendor pays patent royalty to physicians who promote the use of its 
products and services. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
 
Q-11. Vendor gives stock option to physicians who promote its products and 
services. (Dropped after EFA) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
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Hospital Monitoring on P-V Relationship 
Q-12. Physicians have to declare if they have any mutual interests with vendor. 
(Dropped after EFA) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-13. Physicians have to declare if they earn patent royalties from vendor’s 
company. (Dropped after EFA) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-14. Physicians have to declare if they receive payments in exchange of 
consulting for vendor. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-15. Physicians have to declare if they receive honoraria in exchange of 
speeches for vendor. 
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Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-16. Hospital screens payments that physicians receive from vendor in exchange 
of higher utilization IMDs. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-17. Hospital reviews public records to find out about the financial exchanges 
between its physicians and vendors.  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-18. Hospital screens research grants that physicians receive from vendors in 
exchange of higher utilization of IMDs. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-19. Hospital screens research grants that physicians receive from vendors in 
exchange of higher utilization of IMDs. 
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Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-20. Hospital investigates if physician receives stock options from vendor. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-21. Hospital investigates if any member of physician’s family receives 
incentives from vendor. (Dropped after EFA) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Hospital Cooperation Mechanisms for Physician 
Q-22. Hospital dedicates adequate operating room blocks to physicians. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-23. Hospital’s operating rooms utilization is optimized. 
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Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-24. Hospital provides physician with adequate number of nurses. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-25. Hospital involves physicians in decision-making. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-26. Hospital communicates evidence-based data with physicians about the 
effect of their decisions on the balance of cost and quality in purchasing IMDs 
and IMD services. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-27. Hospital passes on savings from IMDs and IMD services cost-cutting 
efforts to physician’s unit. 
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Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-28. Hospital specifically invests in capital equipment for surgical units. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
 
Q-29. Hospital considers rewards for physicians who support initiatives to cut the 
cost of IMDs. (Dropped after EFA) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-30. Hospital has gain sharing programs for physicians. (Dropped after EFA) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-31. Hospital has productivity-based incentives for physicians. (Dropped after 
EFA) 
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Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-32. Hospital has mutual investment with vendors. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-33. Hospital has open communication channels with vendors to receive 
updated information. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-34. Hospital arrange frequent meetings between vendors and hospital 
procurement team. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Hospital Cooperation Mechanisms for Vendor 
Q-35. Hospital commits a certain volume to the vendor in exchange of balanced 
quality and price. 
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Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-36. Please do not answer this question. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-37. Hospital signs long-term contracts with vendor in exchange of balanced 
quality and price. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-38. Hospital promises future contracts to vendors who communicate 
information with hospital. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-39. Hospital promises future contracts to vendors who make specific 
investments for hospital needs. 
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Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-40. Hospital is loyal to vendor and does not switch to new companies, in return 
of above-mentioned efforts of vendor. (Dropped after EFA) 
Physician as Vendor’s Agent 
Q-41. Physicians advocate products and services that vendor provides. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-42. Physicians have longstanding tenure with the vendor that they promote. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-43. Physicians force hospital to purchase IMDs at prices dictated by vendor. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-44. Physicians speak on behalf of vendor in purchasing process. 
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Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-45. Physicians threaten hospital to take their business elsewhere if hospital 
purchases IMDs and IMD services from another vendor. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-46. Physicians rather drop their hospital privilege than abiding by hospital’s 
decision to purchase IMDs and IMD services from another vendor. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-47. Physician has significant leverage in trying to influence hospital decisions 
over which vendor to use. (Dropped after EFA) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-48. Physician’s professional identity and interest overlaps with that of vendor. 
(Dropped after EFA) 
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Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Physician as Hospital's Agent 
Q-49. Physician’s professional identity and interest overlaps with that of hospital. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-50. In value analysis meetings, physicians use their professional knowledge to 
help hospital.  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-51. Physicians share their professional experience with hospital in regards to 
IMDs and IMD procedures. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-52. Physicians have harmonious objectives with hospital in balancing the cost 
and quality of IMDs and IMD services. 
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Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-53. Physicians trust hospital in decisions about balancing the cost and quality 
of IMDs and IMD services. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-54. Physician approve of hospital’s efforts to cut costs of implantable medical 
devices and their related services. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-55. Physicians believe to be in the same boat with hospital, and they both are 
being paid less for implant surgery. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-56. Physicians follow deliberations by value analysis team (VAT) of the 
hospital to make decision to use a given product or work with a given vendor. 
(Dropped after EFA) 
207 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-57. Physicians accept decisions of materials managers or O.R. managers to use 
a given IMD or work with a given vendor. (Dropped after EFA) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
 
Hospital Vendor Relationship 
Q-58. Vendor’s professional identity and prestige depends on providing IMDs 
and rendering IMD services to the hospital. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-59. Vendor provides hospital with the required quality of IMDs, and IMD 
services. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
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Q-60. Vendor accurately supplies the IMDs and IMD services.  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-61. Vendor provides hospital with updated knowledge on the quality of new 
products. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-62. Vendor helps hospital with IMD inventory management through techniques 
like JIT. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-63. Vendor does not abuse its market power to impose higher prices. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-64. Hospital does not abuse its market share to gain unreasonable lower 
prices. (Dropped after EFA) 
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Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-65. Vendor communicates information with hospital about the effect of using 
certain IMDs and IMD services on the balance of quality and cost. (Dropped 
after EFA) 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
 
Standardization of IMD Purchasing Process 
Q-66. Hospital actively controls the process of purchasing IMDs through 
negotiation with vendor and physician. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-67. Hospital restricts the number of approved vendors from which the cardiac 
IMDs are purchased. 
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Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-68. Hospital restricts the number of approved vendors from which the 
orthopedic IMDs are purchased. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-69. Hospital is restricts the price paid for particular types of cardiac IMDs. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-70. Hospital restricts the price paid for particular types of orthopedic IMDs. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
 
Performance 
Q-71. The cost of cardiac and/or orthopedic IMDs is proportionate with the 
quality of IMDs and IMD services, after standardization. (Dropped after EFA) 
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Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-72. Hospital has generated cost savings from efforts to balance cardiac and/or 
orthopedic IMDs and IMD services cost and quality.  
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-73. The total cost of cardiac and/or IMD procedures divided by patient-days is 
lower than last year in this hospital. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-74. Among orthopedic IMD patient, serious surgical site infections that involve 
organs, or implants are: 
 Increased by 100%.  
 Increased by 50%.  
 Increased by 25%.  
 Not changed.  
 Reduced by 25%.  
 Reduced by 50%.  
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 Reduced by 100%.  
Q-75. Among cardiac IMD patient, serious surgical site infections that involve 
organs, or implants are: 
 Increased by 100%.  
 Increased by 50%.  
 Increased by 25%.  
 Not changed.  
 Reduced by 25%.  
 Reduced by 50%.  
 Reduced by 100%. 
Q-76. Average length of stay for orthopedic and/or cardiac IMD patients 
(inpatient days divided by the number of patients’ admissions with the same 
diagnosis-related group) is: 
 Increased by 100%.  
 Increased by 50%.  
 Increased by 25%.  
 Not changed.  
 Reduced by 25%.  
 Reduced by 50%.  
 Reduced by 100%. 
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Q-77. The rate of progress in gaining experience and new skills, among cardiac 
and/or orthopedic physician and medical staff is: 
 Reduced by 100%. 
 Reduced by 50%. 
 Reduced by 25%.  
 Not changed.  
 Increased by 25%.  
 Increased by 50%.  
 Increased by 100%.  
 
Hospital Size 
Q-78. Hospital Size is 
 Small 
 Medium 
 Large 
Hospital Type 
Q-79. This hospital’s type is 
 For Profit   
 Not for Profit 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 Public   
 Teaching Public  
 Teaching Not for Profit  
Hospital Location 
Q-80. Hospital is located in a ----------- area. 
 Rural 
 Urban 
 
Quality (Case Mix Index) 
Q-81. Please estimate your hospital CMI (Case Mix Index)? 
 Below 1.00 
 Between 1.01 and 1.25  
 Between 1.26 and 1.40  
 Between 1.41 and 1.70  
 Above 1.71  
 
Quality (Hospital Reputation) 
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Q-82. Public judgment about the ability of this hospital to deliver care has been 
positive over time. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-83. Cardiac and/or orthopedic physicians are eager to work in our hospital. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
Q-84. This hospital possesses a high prestige in the state/nation. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
 
Physician Employment Status 
 
Q-85. What percentage of cardiac and/or orthopedic physicians are hospital 
employees? 
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 Below 15% 
 Between 15% to 30%  
 Between 30% to 45%  
 Between 45% to 60%  
 Between 60% to 75%  
 Between 75% to 90%  
 Above 90%  
 Hospital Market Share 
Q-86. What percentage of the regional market in cardiac and/or orthopedic IMD 
procedures is controlled by hospital?  
 Below 15%   
 Between 15% to 30%  
 Between 30% to 45%  
 Between 45% to 60%  
 Between 60% to 75%  
 Between 75% to %90  
 Above 90%  
Vendor Competition 
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Q-87. In your opinion the competition among cardiac and/or orthopedic vendors 
is: 
 Very Low 
 Low 
 Low to Moderate  
 Moderate  
 Moderate to High  
 High 
 Very High  
 
Hospital Dependence on Vendor 
 
Q-88. How do you see the dependence of hospital on the cardiac and/or 
orthopedic vendor? 
 Very Low 
 Low 
 Low to Moderate  
 Moderate  
 Moderate to High  
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 High 
 Very High  
 
Vendor Direct to Consumer Marketing 
 
Q-89. The cardiac and/or orthopedic IMDs vendor is active in direct-to-consumer 
advertisement that target general public (patients). 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
 
Q-90. The cardiac and/or orthopedic IMDs vendor is active in research 
publications that target clinicians and physicians. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
 
Q-91. Patient requests for specific IMDs influences physician and hospital’s 
decision to use a given product or work with a given vendor.  
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Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
 
Statistical Control Questions 
The following questions are used for purposes of statistical control only. These 
questions are very important in statistically validating this research. Your answers 
will not be released under any circumstances. 
Q-92. On many occasions, I gave up doing something because I thought it is out 
of my ability. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
 
Q-93. There have been very few times when I felt like rebelling against people in 
authority even though I knew they were right. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
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Q-94. No matter whom I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
 
Q-95. I don’t find it particularly difficult to get along with loud mouthed, 
obnoxious people. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
 
Q-96. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone’s feelings. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
 
Q-97. I usually admit to my mistakes. 
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Strongly 
Disagree 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
N/A 
 
Thank you very much for participating in this research. 
